--- title: "Accelerating Deep Tech in Latin America: Opportunities, Challenges & Recommendations" author: - "Claudio Cifuentes Lobo" - "Marcus Alburez Myers" - "Leonardo Quattrucci" date: "2025-09-23" version: 2.0 tags: - deep tech - latin america - investment - technology - innovation - biotech - AI - blockchain - research - special economic zones - accelerators - startups --- # Accelerating Deep Tech in Latin America ## Table of Contents * [Foreword](#foreword) * [Executive Summary](#executive-summary) * [Methodology](#methodology) * [What is Deep Tech?](#what-is-deep-tech) * [Structural Challenges and Technological Opportunities in Latin America](#structural-challenges-and-technological-opportunities-in-latin-america) * [LATAM’s Deep Tech Landscape](#latams-deep-tech-landscape) * [Startup Success Stories](#startup-success-stories) * [Deep Tech Investment in LATAM](#deep-tech-investment-in-latam) * [From the LATAM Discount to Fair Value](#from-the-latam-discount-to-fair-value) * [Recommendations: Closing the LATAM Discount in Deep Tech](#recommendations-closing-the-latam-discount-in-deep-tech) * [Venture Building: The Science-to-Startup Pipeline](#venture-building-the-science-to-startup-pipeline) * [Metrics & Success Stories—Deep Tech KPI frameworks](#metrics--success-storiesdeep-tech-kpi-frameworks) * [Showcase & Visibility—Educate Privately, Convene Publicly](#showcase--visibilityeducate-privately-convene-publicly) * [Impact-Driven Narratives—Deep Tech for SDGs](#impact-driven-narrativesdeep-tech-for-sdgs) * [Global Mindset—Language First, Structure Next](#global-mindsetlanguage-first-structure-next) * [R&D Skepticism: Regional International Scientific Advisory Boards](#rd-skepticism-regional-international-scientific-advisory-boards) * [Uneven Clinical Trials: Alignment Through Interoperability](#uneven-clinical-trials-alignment-through-interoperability) * [Regulatory Portability: The 34th Regime](#regulatory-portability-the-34th-regime) * [Pensions: A Fund-of-Funds for Domestic Deep Tech](#pensions-a-fund-of-funds-for-domestic-deep-tech) * [Social Clusters: International Cohorts & Ecosystem-as-a-Service](#social-clusters-international-cohorts--ecosystem-as-a-service) * [CVC: Matchmaking Bridges & Observatory](#cvc-matchmaking-bridges--observatory) * [How SEZs 4.0 Convert the LATAM Discount into a Defensible Edge](#how-sezs-40-convert-the-latam-discount-into-a-defensible-edge) * [The New Battlefronts of Tech](#the-new-battlefronts-of-tech) * [Why Latin America is a Lab for the New World Order](#why-latin-america-is-a-lab-for-the-new-world-order) * [China’s Deep Tech Plans](#chinas-deep-tech-plans) * [Middle Powers: A New Path for Deep Tech Advancement](#middle-powers-a-new-path-for--deep-tech-advancement) * [Appropriation vs Autonomy: The Latin American Dilemma](#appropriation-vs-autonomy-the-latin-american-dilemma) * [Bibliography](#bibliography) * [Contributors](#contributors) --- ## Partners This report is the culmination of collaboration with key regional innovators GRIDX, LatamScaleUP, N7V, Access Partnership, Societas Sapiens, Inc., Center for Public Intelligence (CPI), Hello Tomorrow, SF500, Vesper Biotechnologies, Actionworks, Zentynel Frontier Investments, MERGE Madrid, GrupoCASA, and Odisea Labs. It was made possible by a grant from the International Strategy Forum. --- ## Blurbs > “Having a report on Deep Tech in Latin America is undoubtedly an essential contribution to the advancement of these technologies in our region. For us, who support startups and pre-scaleups seeking to expand beyond the region, relevant information like the one we find in this report will help us progress even further in a sector where we have immense development potential to generate global companies.” > > **Sandra Sinicco,** > CEO of LatamScaleup and GrupoCASA --- > “The report provides actionable insights for policymakers, investors, and technology leaders seeking to understand how Latin America can harness Deep Technology innovation to enhance its strategic autonomy, economic competitiveness, and influence in this global geopolitical transition where technological capabilities will define the new world order. As digital infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, and emerging technologies become the new battlegrounds of international relations, Latin America’s choices today will determine its position in tomorrow’s technology-driven international system.” > > **Fausto Carbajal Glass,** > Senior Advisor on Political Risk at Miranda Partners --- > “This report gives a clear view of the state of Deep Tech in Latin America, showing both the opportunities and the challenges. By sharing success stories and practical recommendations, it brings attention to an ecosystem that often does not get enough visibility. The region has big market needs in food, energy, and mobility, good access to international markets, and in some cases more flexible regulations — all of which make it a good place to test and grow new technologies. From a European point of view, but with Latin American roots, it is clear that the region already has companies that can compete at the highest level. What is needed now is more global awareness, capital, and partnerships to help Latin American Deep Tech scale worldwide.” > > **Orlando Ramírez,** > Deep Tech Pioneer & Global Challenge Specialist at Hello Tomorrow --- > “Latin America has tremendous potential to transform scientific knowledge into global solutions, especially in biosciences. Organizations like SF500 and LADP play a crucial role in converting science into startups and connecting them with global markets. Though challenges exist, what matters most is taking action, learning from mistakes, and consistently working toward creating a diverse, thriving ecosystem. This report systematizes experiences and guides us in building Latin America’s Deep Tech future.” > > **Juan Soria,** > Managing Partner of SF500 --- ## Foreword *By Leonardo Quattrucci & Marcus Alburez Myers, Co-Founders of the Latin American Dynamism Project* Geopolitics is re-shaping the geography of innovation. In 2025, countries compete for technological superiority, splitting the world back into spheres of influence. In a way, the 2020s are the new 1970s. Nations have restored Cold War aims: to outcompete rivals by appropriating the resources necessary to develop critical technologies with strategic autonomy. There are, however, significant differences between now and the Cold War era. First, the portfolio of technologies that are considered critical to national interests is broader and deeper, ranging from advanced artificial intelligence to quantum technologies and biotechnologies. Second, the supply chain necessary to construct these technologies is inherently global. Thus, protectionist strategies to re-shore production clash against the networked nature of innovation. Today, “no country alone can make an iPhone” – as Economist Eric Beinhocker put it. Deep tech presents even greater barriers to autonomous development, given the complexity and distribution of inputs it requires, from rare minerals to skilled labor. Finally, with traditional alliances fading, the global race for competitiveness is participated by more players with their own interests. Today’s world has more than two poles of influence. These new geometries of power leave room for new players to affirm themselves on the global stage. Latin America is one such player. Latin America has traditionally had a passive role in the development of the global technology industry. It has traded at a deficit with bigger partners, serving skills, resources, and market opportunities at a discount, an effect widely known as the “Latin American Discount. It is a function of the institutional fragility of individual countries in the region and of the region’s fragmentation, which prevents it from leveraging its size and competitive advantages as a bloc. Foreign investors cannot value opportunities at their actual worth when the context is plagued by uncertain rules, frequent corruption, and inadequate public sector de-risking of emerging markets. Yet, current changes in geopolitics can change the position of Latin America from a Deep Tech vassal to a stronghold. This is the thesis behind the Latin American Dynamism Project, which is to accelerate the development and investment of frontier technologies in Latin America. The region is home to 42% of the world’s biodiversity; controls the lithium triangle, which contains 58% of global reserves; possesses abundant clean-energy potential—critical for scaling compute-intensive industries; and benefits from a booming nearshoring trend. With a GDP of roughly USD 6 trillion—almost double that of India but with barely half the population—the region combines large-market scale with significant availability for greenfield development. What Latin America lacks is the network effects—in infrastructure, capital, and human talent—that can catalyse its potential into strategic autonomy, founded upon technological competitiveness. Realizing this potential will require coordinated action across the region: no single country has the scale, resources, and institutional reach to compete alone in the global Deep Tech race.The LADP addresses this gap by providing unprecedented insights to public and private decision-makers. This inaugural LADP report reveals more than a set of surprising data, which shows that LATAM is already a theatre for overlooked inventions. It shows regional and global decision-makers a path to making LATAM an autonomous and reputable player in the global race for technological competitiveness. Some countries, such as China, have long understood this, undertaking for a decade now policies of appropriation of natural resources. Others, from Latin American countries to traditional Western Allies, have been slower to realise the potential of the region as more than the sum of its parts. We publish these insights with the ambition to catalyze conversations, communities, and ecosystems that accelerate the transition of Latin America from a battleground for technological appropriation to a strategic actor in tech-driven geopolitics. --- ## Acknowledgments This report was authored by Claudio Cifuentes Lobo, Marcus Alburez Myers, Leonardo Quattrucci, Verónica Jijón and Said Saillant, with Nick Cohen and Fausto Carbajal Glass providing essential editorial guidance. Their combined expertise in data analysis, regional policy, and ecosystem development underpin every section of this publication. Production, design, data science, and communications were handled by Lucía Fenoglio, Solange Rodríguez, Milene Broche, Sebastián Díaz, Agustina Sojit, and Marco Tebalán. To shape our findings, we spoke with almost 100 contributors and partnered with 12 organizations —venture‐capital executives, policy‐makers and ecosystem leaders—who generously shared their time and candid perspectives. Their efforts ensured we captured both quantitative metrics and rich qualitative insights from developers, community organizers, and institutional stakeholders throughout Latin America. This report was made possible by a grant from the International Strategy Forum, founded by Dr. Eric Schmidt, former CEO and Chairman of Google. We appreciate the institutions and platforms that provided proprietary datasets and analytical tools, as well as our advisory board and academic peers whose feedback strengthened our methodology. --- ## Methodology This report combines **quantitative and qualitative research methods** to provide a comprehensive overview of the Deep Tech ecosystem in Latin America. ### Quantitative Approach We began with a dataset of **5,000 Deep Tech companies from LATAM**, sourced primarily from **Tracxn**. After a review process, we retained ~2,500 **companies** for our final analysis. The data cutoff date was **March 2025**. To assist with accuracy in classification, we employed **large language models (LLMs)** for initial categorization, supplemented by meticulous manual validation. For the manual checks, our team reviewed open-source materials—including patents, scientific publications, documentation, and corporate disclosures—to verify whether companies met established criteria for Deep Tech classification. The primary challenge in this process involved distinguishing companies that leverage trendy technologies like Artificial Intelligence primarily as superficial marketing strategies from those genuinely developing novel, scientifically rigorous solutions. Another critical obstacle we encountered was the lack of a shared, comprehensive, and openly accessible regional database. During our literature review, we found that existing reports frequently rely on proprietary datasets or private data brokers, limiting their value as a universally acceptable benchmark for ecosystem mapping. Therefore, it is important to note that this is **not an exhaustive database,** but the most complete mapping we have seen to date. For our statistical analysis, we identified additional companies through secondary sources that were **not included in the statistical analysis**, due to incomplete data on key variables such as funding history or country of origin. However, these companies were incorporated into the overall mapping to better reflect the breadth of the ecosystem. To classify the companies by Deep Tech vertical, we took the 12 categories proposed by the 2023 *Deep Tech: The New Wave* report, backed by the Inter-American Development Bank’s: Robotics, Spacetech, Advanced Mobility, Biotechnology, Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence, Cleantech, Advanced Materials, Healthtech, Infinite Computing, Advanced Manufacturing, and Nanotechnology. To classify the companies by industries, we took the 8 categories proposed by EMERGE’s 2024 *Relatorio Deep Tech Brasil*: Agribusiness & Animal Health, Food & Beverages, Cosmetics & Wellness, Energy, Chemicals, Petrochemicals & Materials, Human Health & Pharmaceuticals, Sustainability & Environment, Other. ### Qualitative Approach Our qualitative research consisted of **5 roundtables and 100+ interviews** with stakeholders across the ecosystem, including founders, investors, accelerators, researchers, and government actors. Specifically, we asked them: * What key gaps make LATAM investment less attractive to global VCs, and which resources would help bridge that gap? * What do investors in LATAM’s deep tech ecosystem look for when deciding to fund startups at both the regional and global levels? * How would you design a regional coalition that bridges local startups with global investment? This report synthesizes insights from these conversations without attributing specific comments. We applied an **obstacles-first** lens to surface the binding constraints blocking ecosystem transformation, synthesizing them from interviews, roundtables, and document review. This framing grounds our recommendations in removing root causes rather than proposing generic, solution-first fixes. This mixed-methods approach allows for a nuanced understanding of both the structural patterns and lived experiences shaping Deep Tech in the region. It aims to describe transformative opportunities in the structural context of LATAM, and most importantly outline actionable levers in a way that balances strategic vision with the operational realities of ecosystem building. --- ## What is Deep Tech? **Deep Tech** is the set of *emerging* technologies that spring from frontier science or breakthrough engineering, offer a step-change over today’s solutions, and are primarily aimed at solving fundamental economic, social or environmental challenges. These technologies share five hallmarks, as noted in previous literature[^1]: 1. **Radical novelty** – they introduce genuinely new technical capabilities; 2. **Fast growth** – research, patents and investment expand rapidly; 3. **Coherence** – a recognizable knowledge base and community forms around them; 4. **High-impact potential, often with long development timelines** – their main socioeconomic effects are expected, not fully realised; 5. **Uncertainty & ambiguity** – outcomes, markets and standards are still fluid. At its core, **Deep Tech is the business of turning frontier science into products**—the commercialisation of laboratory breakthroughs through structured *technology-transfer* processes. Whether the advance comes from a new material, a novel bioprocess, or a cutting-edge AI algorithm, the venture’s value proposition hinges on owning (or licensing) that underlying intellectual property and engineering it into a scalable solution that can redefine an industry. **By contrast, sectors such as fintech or general consumer software build mainly on technologies that already exist.** They remix mature stacks of code and cloud infrastructure to create new user experiences or business models, but do not introduce a fundamentally new technology layer. In that sense they are sometimes dubbed *“shallow tech”* or *“regular tech”*—innovations driven more by application design than by scientific discovery. In Latin America Deep Tech ventures are commonly labelled *Emprendimientos de Base Científico-Tecnológica* (EBCT) amongst policy papers, innovation-law frameworks and regional multilaterals like the ECLAC[^2]. In China, we have found that the homologous term is **“*New Infrastructure*” (新基建),** which is embedded in State Council guidelines and provincial five-year plans as the umbrella for AI, advanced manufacturing, and other Deep Tech priorities[^3]. | Category | Definition | Examples of Use Cases | Value of the Use Case | | :-------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | **Artificial Intelligence** | The ability of a machine or computer system to perform cognitive functions that are usually associated with humans, such as learning, problem-solving, and decision-making. | In healthcare, for improving diagnosis accuracy with medical imaging devices (e.g., Samsung developed a tool based on ultrasound images). Its AI algorithms facilitated an about 5% increase in the diagnosis accuracy of breast lesions. | To enhance the relationship with customers by suggesting better deals, trying virtual products, managing and reviewing subscriptions, verifying payments, and conducting follow-ups in a safe and privacy-friendly way. | | **Advanced Materials** | Technology that modifies or engineers new materials at a molecular level to create superior performance properties, such as enhanced durability, conductivity, or sustainability. | In the automotive and transportation sectors, for the production of environmentally friendly batteries for electric vehicles (e.g., Tesla, General Motors). The technology enables materials to store and release energy more efficiently. | To support climate change impact and eco-friendly sustainable transformations. These materials are foundational to a wide range of innovations, from renewable energy systems to lightweight structures. | | **Biotechnology** | The use of living organisms or biological systems to create or develop new products, technologies, or processes that benefit humanity in fields such as health, agriculture, and energy. | In energy and utilities, for the production of liquid biofuels and methane from organic waste (e.g., ENI, ExxonMobil). The use of microorganisms transforms waste into a valuable energy source. | To improve climate change impact and eco-friendly sustainable developments. Additionally, it can address global health challenges through new medicines, or food scarcity through enhanced agricultural products. | | **Blockchain** | A decentralized and immutable ledger technology that stores transactions and tracks assets, enabling a secure and transparent record without the need for a central authority. | In the financial sector, for tracking negotiating conditions of a loan between borrowers and lenders, or to understand the loan’s process from start to finish (e.g., consultancy Indra borrowed €75 million from BBVA). | To enhance tracking, traceability, and safety in the area of distribution; to achieve greater transparency in negotiations, and to improve the supply chain. | | **Robotics and Drones** | The use of machines to perform automated tasks, often in complex or hazardous environments. This subcategory includes flying crafts and remote-controlled systems for various industrial and logistical activities. | In retail, for managing stores via an automated system that retrieves products from shelves (e.g., Amazon Robotics). In logistics, drones enable pre-sequencing of items or final delivery to customers (e.g., the use of drones for home delivery). | To speed up traditional processes such as the movement of pallets or the barcode scan, and to reduce the customer order cycle by improving order accuracy and decreasing waiting periods. | | **Photonics and Electronics**| Technology that enhances the properties of photons (light) to transmit information or to actuate. As a subset, a similar process is followed with electrons in electronic devices. | In the food and beverage sector, it incorporates machine elements such as advanced cameras, thermal, or multi-spectral sensors for food safety (e.g., PepsiCo installs vision-inspection systems to detect color defects in whole potatoes). | To increase transparency and customer trust. These technologies are also critical for advancing fields like telecommunications, computing, and medical diagnostics. | | **Quantum Computing** | Another way of processing information, this technology leverages the properties of matter at a nanoscale to perform complex calculations that are impossible for classical computers. | In telecommunications, to optimize radio cells (e.g., the operator TIM, optimized with an algorithm that uses quantum principles) in collaboration with the hardware producer D-Wave. The algorithms enhance signal quality and network efficiency. | To ensure reliable mobile services with high performance; to increase transparency and a generally trusted network. Quantum computing has the potential to solve complex problems in fields like medicine, finance, and materials science. | ### Deep Tech Investment Beyond defining Deep Tech itself, the primary hesitation surrounding investment in this sector often emerges from evaluating critical metrics—particularly funding cycles and return on investment—in comparison to traditional technology sectors such as fintech. Fortunately, various studies have started to quantify these concerns. For example, a McKinsey report analyzing European and U.S. Deep Tech funds reveals an average net internal rate of return (IRR) of 17%, outperforming traditional tech funds, which yield an average of 10%[^4]. The 2025 European Deep Tech Report identified and addressed eight prevalent misconceptions about Deep Tech investments. The report clarifies common misunderstandings around factors such as the amount of capital required, timeframes to achieve exits, revenue timelines, and overall success rates[^5]. In parallel, it also provides high-level risk-profile comparison helps illustrate the fundamental differences between Deep Tech and conventional tech ventures. Deep Tech startups carry substantially higher technology risk, require large upfront capital expenditures, and face protracted development cycles measured in years rather than months. Yet, once past those hurdles, they enjoy a powerful competitive moat—anchored in proprietary scientific breakthroughs, extensive IP portfolios, and teams of niche technical experts—that most “regular” tech firms simply cannot replicate. However, the absence of directly comparable data specific to Latin America complicates the task of contextualizing these findings within the regional ecosystem, thereby underscoring the imperative for localized research and data collection. Furthermore, the stakeholders interviewed for this report indicated that Latin American investors are accustomed to shorter, traditional business cycles and may exhibit reluctance to await several years for tangible returns. --- ## Structural Challenges and Technological Opportunities in Latin America: A Deep Tech Perspective Latin America sits at a pivotal crossroads. On one flank, a web of long-standing deficits—in healthcare, learning, public trust, labor formality, financial inclusion, infrastructure, energy, and cybersecurity—continues to sap productivity and widen inequality. Roughly **140 million people** still lack reliable access to basic health services[^6], and the latest PISA results reveal that teenagers in the region perform the equivalent of **three to seven school-years behind** their OECD peers in mathematics[^7]. While this significant educational gap acts as a barrier to economic and social development, it also presents a prime opportunity for innovative edtech solutions. Confidence in government has slipped so far that **seven in ten citizens express little to no trust** in their national institutions[^8], fuelling political volatility just as the digital economy demands stable rules of the game. Add to this a labor market in which nearly **one-half of jobs are informal[^9]**, a persistent digital divide that leaves **230 million Latin Americans offline[^10]**, and rising cyber-incidents (LATAM became the world’s fastest-growing region for disclosed cyber-incidents by 2024[^11]), and Deep Tech innovation can seem a distant luxury. Yet the very scale of these gaps hints at outsized opportunity. The region commands world-class biodiversity, booming renewable-energy corridors, and a growing cadre of STEM researchers eager to found science-based companies. This potential is most evident in lithium, where Latin America holds nearly two thirds of global lithium reserves, concentrated in the “Lithium Triangle” of Bolivia (24%), Argentina (22%) and Chile (11%), although Chile has led the way by turning its reserves into commercial production[^12]. Beyond the momentum of its resources, Latin America offers compelling opportunities for **greenfield FDI**—that is, projects where companies establish new subsidiaries and build facilities from the ground up rather than acquiring existing assets. Greenfields are attractive in the region given abundant land and natural resources, improving logistics links, and the ability to tailor plants to modern standards (energy efficiency, automation, and export compliance). For aerospace specifically, for instance, **select geographies near the equator** offer orbital-mechanics advantages for certain launch profiles, adding a niche location edge[^13]. In fact, according to the UNCTAD World Investment Report 2025, developing countries attracted more than $530 billion in greenfield digital economy projects between 2020 and 2024. Notably, close to 80% of this investment was concentrated in just ten countries, with Brazil and Mexico the only Latin American economies represented in this group[^14]. Moreover, amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, near-shoring –the practice of relocating operations to nearby countries rather than distant off-shore locations– is fundamentally disrupting the decades old model of prioritizing lowest-cost production, by instead emphasizing supply chain resilience and regional proximity. Latin America has emerged as a prime beneficiary of this shift as companies in North America, for instance, move focus "from pure cost efficiency toward resilience, redundancy, and regional integration," according to Fausto Carbajal from the Mexican Institute for Strategic Studies[^15]. Mexico leads LATAM’s nearshoring wave, thanks to its geographic proximity, free-trade agreements, skilled and cost-competitive labor, and an extensive logistics network—advantages expected to favor semiconductors, automotive, electrical equipment, medical devices, agribusiness, and food sectors[^16]. Santander Mexico estimates that near-shoring could drive FDI to levels exceeding remittances as soon as 2025[^17]. Beyond Mexico, countries like Colombia are becoming specialized IT hubs, creating complementary regional ecosystems[^18]. In other words, Latin America possesses the natural endowments, human capital and early-stage funding momentum to turn Deep Tech from a remote aspiration into a practical engine of inclusive growth. Understanding this dual reality—the entrenched gaps and the emergent assets—is the first step. The pages that follow map the region’s structural challenges, spotlight global case studies of successful leap-frogging, and lay out the policy, capital-market and talent interventions to close the region’s long-standing ‘LatAm Discount’. ### LatAm’s Structural Problems – A Snapshot * **Health:** 35% of the population reports unmet health care needs (PAHO) * **Education:** 75% of students are below basic proficiency levels in maths (PISA) * **Governance:** 36% of the population trusts its government (OECD) * **Work:** 48% of the labor force works in the informal economy (OIT) * **Agroecology:** 50% of the workforce is employed in agri-food systems (FAO) * **Energy:** 17 million people have no access to electricity (IEA) * **Finance:** 27% of population remain unbanked (WB) * **Urbanisation:** 80% of Latin Americans live in cities (WB) * **Cybersecurity:** US $90 billions are lost annually to cyber-attacks (OEA-IDB) ### Yet LATAM is singularly primed for Deep Tech * **Biodiversity:** 42% of the world’s biodiversity sits in LATAM (Deep Tech Colombia) * **Lithium:** LATAM contains an estimated 58% of the world’s lithium resources (USGS) * **Renewables:** 65% of LATAM’s electricity comes from renewable sources—well above the global average of 41% (EMBER) * **STEM Researchers:** 865k STEM researchers in LATAM—but less than 1% work in deep tech, revealing a 100x runway of untapped talent (IDB) * **Fintech:** 28% CAGR in fintech startups, 2017–2023 (Finnovista) * **Internet and Mobile Penetration:** Internet coverage and usage in LATAM stands at approximately 83%, with countries like Costa Rica, Argentina and Chile exceeding 85%. (GSMA) * **EdTech:** The EdTech market in Latin America is projected to reach $3 billion by 2023, growing at a CAGR of 15% (Heimi) * **E-commerce:** E-commerce sales revenue in Latin America is predicted to reach over $125 billion in 2027 (Parcelmonitor) * **Nearshoring Trends:** Companies are shifting supply chains to LATAM to mitigate risks exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions elsewhere. ### And is already steadily venturing towards Deep Tech * **2019–2023 Investment growth:** 600% growth in Deep Tech investment was recorded between 2019–2023 (IDB) * **2024 Funding growth:** 219% YoY Deep Tech funding growth in 2024, making it the fastest-growing tech sector in LATAM (SLing Hub) * **2024 Equity Funding growth:** 189% YoY growth in equity funding in 2024, making Deep Tech the YoY leader across all tech verticals (SLinghub) * **Corporate Venture Capital:** 4× growth for Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) in LATAM deep tech from 2020 to 2024 (Dealroom) * **Gross Average Return:** 72% was the gross average return generated by LATAM biotech startups 2015–2023 (SOSV/IndieBio) * **2032 projection:** 20× Deep Tech ecosystem growth by 2032 estimated by (IDB) --- ## LATAM’s Deep Tech Landscape The database used for this analysis comprises **2,566 LATAM startups**. This specific count differs from our initial estimate of over 5,000 startups in the region after a filtering; a more detailed explanation of our methodology is provided in the Methodology section. For context, **the IDB** mapped **340** Deep Tech startups in LATAM in 2023[^19], and **EMERGE** reported **over 1,300 in 2025[^20]**. Our higher count reflects an expanded sector scope that **includes AI and cryptography**, two verticals that have grown sharply in the last five years. The main discrepancy comes mainly because we expanded the scope of the database to AI and cryptography, 2 verticals that have significantly grown in the last 2 years. This is **work in progress** and will expand as we validate additional rounds. This underscores the limits of **closed, proprietary databases** maintained in parallel by different actors—divergent definitions, methods, and limited auditability—driving many of the discrepancies across reports. The robust path is a **regional, open, versioned, auditable dataset** with a **shared taxonomy**, **transparent inclusion criteria**, and a **public correction/contribution workflow**—ideally API-interoperable and stewarded by **multi-stakeholder governance**. ### Geographical Analysis LATAM’s Deep Tech landscape is sharply concentrated: Brazil hosts about 41% of all startups—driven by São Paulo’s 29% share—while Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, together with their leading capitals (Buenos Aires, Santiago, Mexico City and Bogotá), gather most of the rest, leaving a long tail of smaller countries and cities that underscores both the ecosystem’s strength and its geographic imbalance. #### Country distribution * **Brazil dominates the landscape** with **1,048 Deep Tech startups**—about **40.8% of the entire regional database**. Brazil’s share is larger than that of the next four countries combined, underscoring its role as the focal point for venture creation, talent and capital in Latin America. * **Mexico (358 startups, 14%)**, **Argentina (256, 10%)**, **Chile (251, 9.8%)** and **Colombia (219, 8.5%)** form a solid “second tier.” Together with Brazil, these five countries host **83% of all mapped companies**, illustrating a highly concentrated ecosystem. * Beyond the “Big 5”, there is a **long tail of emerging hubs** comprising **Panama**, **Peru**, **Puerto Rico**, **Uruguay** and **Ecuador**. Their smaller—but growing—communities highlight fresh opportunities for investors looking for earlier-stage, less-crowded markets. Cultivating a distributed tech ecosystem depends on a **dual-approach strategy** that both reinforces major existing hubs**–**like São Paulo, and Mexico City– while simultaneously nurturing new ecosystems across the region such as Uruguay and Costa Rica, for instance. To do so, we will examine Social Clusters—coordinated networks of companies, universities, labs, investors, and public agencies that share infrastructure, talent pipelines, and market access to create collective competitive advantage. Specifically, two strategies documented in Chile and Colombia: first, **mixed cohorts** that place international and local founders in the same programs to maximize peer-learning; and second, **ecosystem-as-a-service (EaaS)** operators that provide shared services so startups can progress faster. #### City-level distribution * São Paulo is Latin America’s undisputed Deep Tech largest hub with 329 startups, roughly 29 % of all ventures in the top-10 cities—more than the next three hubs combined. * Buenos Aires, Santiago and Mexico City form a strong second tier. Together with São Paulo they account for 63 % of the mapped activity, making them the primary gateways for talent, capital and corporate partnerships. * Bogotá anchors the Andean corridor, but its scale remains half that of the tier-two group, signalling room for growth of seed and Series A funding. * Brazil fields five of the top-ten hubs—São Paulo plus Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre—highlighting powerful domestic network effects and sectoral specialisation. In parallel to Social Cluster strategies, another concrete initiative for promoting a more decentralized and equitable tech ecosystem is the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) specifically tailored for Deep Tech ventures. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are specific areas within a country's borders that operate under unique business regulations, often with special rules for investment, trade, and taxation[^21]. SEZs have a proven record: **Shenzhen** vaulted from a fishing village to a tech metropolis that contributes a meaningful slice of China’s GDP and millions of jobs[^22]. In Latin America, **Costa Rica’s** free-zone regime now drives a significant share of GDP and high-skill employment[^23], while **Uruguay’s** twelve free zones have helped deliver near-record exports[^24]. By strategically building these zones on greenfield sites, away from the established, dominant hubs like São Paulo, the goal is to redistribute startup activity and foster new, vibrant communities. The concept of using these zones to address the geographic concentration of Deep Tech talent and capital will be explored in greater detail in a subsequent section of this report. ### Funding Stage and Tickets Our analysis indicates a significant funding gap in Latin America's Deep Tech landscape. While capital flow has rebounded since the 2021 pandemic and big tech crisis, few startups progress beyond Seed rounds as of 2025. Only a small fraction secure Series A funding, and even fewer reach Series B or later stages. This is consistent with the Inter-American Development Bank findings of 2023, which identified that up until 2022, 65% of Deep Tech startups in LATAM were still in their pre-seed and seed phases, having raised less than $1 million. In stark contrast, a scant 8% of these startups have progressed to secure Series B investments, those exceeding $10 million, roughly. * The ecosystem is heavily front-loaded: 72% of ventures are still at **Seed** stage funding, and only 19% have secured a Series A. * Dramatically, only **22 startups (10%)** have secured a **Series B round or beyond**, confirming a steep funnel from validation to scale-up funding. * This drop-off mirrors other Latin-American Deep Tech reports that flag a chronic shortage of growth capital. According to Dealroom’s data, even as overall Deep Tech funding remained robust at $138 million in 2024, **not a single Series B or later round closed in LATAM[^25].** * Additionally, our data reveals the median round size for Deep Tech ventures scales from **US$0.6 M (Seed)** to **US$8.3 M (Series A)**, then leaps to **US$17 M (Series B)** and **US$100 M (Series C)**. ### Funding Rounds and Size Over Time Over the past five years, the number of funding rounds in LATAM’s Deep Tech sector has increased, yet the average cheque size has fallen dramatically from its 2021 high. While more startups are attracting investors, capital is being spread across a larger pool of early-stage companies, which further highlights the Series A+ funding gap. * In 2021, there were only 27 rounds recorded, which nonetheless coincided with unusually large tickets, signalling investor preference for fewer, late-stage bets straight out of the pandemic. * In 2022, deal activity more than doubled as capital dispersed into a wider set of companies—an early sign that investors were shifting toward earlier-stage and smaller cheques. * In 2023, the round-count fell by 30% from 2022, and, more dramatically, a 70% drop in the size of the average check, reflecting heightened caution towards larger rounds. * But in 2024, activity rebounded to its highest level by round count, yet still skewed toward early-stage financing, underscoring that confidence in Deep Tech fundamentals returned faster than appetite for large growth cheques. * Overall, this shows investors retreating to safer, smaller bets—leaving the Series B–C “scale-up gap” even wider. ### Sector Coverage Given the absence of sector-level disaggregation in our data, we use the Inter-American Development Bank’s *Deep Tech: The New Wave* as the reference framework for sector coverage and benchmarking. By 2023, Biotechnology (61%) dominated LATAM’s Deep Tech, followed by Artificial Intelligence (11%). Together they represented 72% of regional startups. This balance reflects the critical role these technologies play in tackling challenges like sustainable agriculture, food security, and healthcare. According to the IDB, the prevalence of biotech aligns with the region’s “abundant specialized talent in biological sciences, the international competitiveness of the agricultural sector, and the remarkable biodiversity that serves as a resource for researchers.” 1. Costa Rica and Argentina illustrate this concentration, with 97% and 80% of their respective Deep Tech ecosystem value coming from biotech. 2. Establishment Labs, a Costa Rica–based biotech company, stands as the region’s most valuable player (USD 1.8 billion). 3. SOSV/IndieBio reported a 72% gross average return on investment in LAC Deep Tech startups between 2015 and 2023, underscoring the potential of this burgeoning sector. Beyond these two leading areas, the landscape includes: Nanotechnology (6%), Clean Tech (5%), Spacetech (4%), Advanced Mobility (4%), Robotics (2%), Advanced Manufacturing (2%), Health Tech (2%), Advanced Materials (1%), Medical Devices & Others (<1%). While these sectors are carving out promising niches, the region’s Deep Tech ecosystem remains starved for capital—receiving just a fraction of the investment per researcher seen in leading markets. Indeed, venture funding for R&D in LATAM is roughly 13 times lower than in China and 70 times lower than in the U.S., a shortfall that chokes off early‐stage growth and risks leaving many of these emerging technologies underdeveloped[^26]. For subsequent editions, it is crucial to incorporate sector-level disaggregation at the source. We recommend adopting the IDB’s taxonomy for consistency and building an open-source, versioned map of projects (with minimum fields such as sector, sub-sector, TRL, location, funding stage, investors, and public links), so the community can audit entries, submit updates, and cross-check against existing mappings—ultimately consolidating a single, centralized directory for the Deep Tech startups in the region. ### Who Is Investing By 2023, there were 65 VC funds with at least one Deep Tech investment in LATAM, according to the IDB, both regional and international. By 2025, Hello Tomorrow’s Deep Tech Investor Mapping has identified nearly 40 VC funds active in the region[^27]. Below, we present a non-exhaustive selection of funds. Further initiatives should combine doing targeted desk research (manual scanning for programs), open calls for submissions to capture emerging funds, and cross-referencing against other existing exercises. Beyond updating coverage, the analysis should move from *presence* to *intensity*. Instead of simply listing who invests, quantify how often each investor backs Deep Tech startups (deal counts over the last 24–36 months), at which stages and ticket sizes, their follow-on behavior, and the *graduation* rate of portfolio companies (e.g., progression from pre-seed/seed to Series A within 12–24 months). Furthermore, this pass should also isolate corporate venture capital activity—where checks, pilots, and timelines can differ from traditional VC—and explicitly add family offices and sovereign wealth funds, which emerged in our interviews as increasingly relevant co-investors and partners. --- ## Startup Success Stories ### Argentina #### [Puna Bio](https://www.puna.bio/en) Puna Bio develops biological inputs for agriculture from extremophile microbes found in high-altitude deserts, capable of increasing yields and improving soil health in a sustainable way. These microbes help plants withstand extreme weather conditions, reducing the need for chemical fertilizers. Backed by The Gates Foundation and SOSV/IndieBio, the company was selected as a Deep Tech Pioneer in Hello Tomorrow's 2024 Challenge in the Food & Agriculture category. Additional support comes from Cleantech 50 to Watch and Grid Exponential recognition. * **Location:** Buenos Aires * **Creation Date:** 2021 * **Sector:** Biotechnology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Series A * **Total Funding:** USD 24.3M #### [Satellogic](https://satellogic.com/) Satellogic operates a scalable Earth observation platform through a constellation of 34 high-resolution Low Earth Orbit satellites, providing affordable geospatial data for various industries. The company's satellite technology enables real-time monitoring and analysis of global environmental and economic activities. With $239 million in total equity funding from investors including Liberty Strategic Capital and Tencent, the company completed its most recent $10 million post-IPO round in December 2024. The Inter-American Development Bank has also provided significant backing for their space technology platform. * **Location:** Buenos Aires * **Creation Date:** 2010 * **Sector:** Space Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** IPO * **Total Funding:** USD 134.5M #### [M4Life](https://www.microbesforlife.com/) M4Life applies biologically trained microbes to seeds for soil restoration and deforestation prevention, with additional CO₂ capture capabilities. The company is developing an organism-free metabolite version for large-scale commercialization of their sustainable agriculture solutions. Recognized through MassChallenge and SF500, this CONICET spinoff was selected as a Deep Tech Pioneer & Finalist in Hello Tomorrow's 2024 Challenge. Their innovative approach represents a promising solution for environmental restoration while maintaining agricultural productivity. * **Location:** Tucumán * **Creation Date:** 2023 * **Sector:** Biotechnology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 6-7 * **Stage:** Pre-Seed * **Total Funding:** USD 276.3K #### [Auth0](https://auth0.com/) Auth0 was founded to simplify and secure authentication and authorization for modern applications. From its inception, the platform embraced open standards—such as JSON Web Tokens, OpenID Connect, and SAML—to ensure developers could integrate identity features without lock-in and easily migrate if needs changed. The core product offers a drop-in solution that supports username/password, social logins, enterprise directories, and passwordless flows. By mid-2020, it had raised over US $210 million across multiple rounds, culminating in a US $120 million Series E led by Salesforce Ventures at a US $1.92 billion valuation. In March 2021, Okta acquired Auth0 in an all-stock transaction valued at US $6.5 billion, marking one of the largest exits in Latin American tech history. * **Location:** Argentina * **Creation Date:** 2013 * **Sector:** Cryptography * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Acquired * **Total Funding:** USD 332.3M ### Brazil #### [Tractian](https://tractian.com/en) Tractian combines integrated hardware, software, and AI to democratize predictive and preventive maintenance capabilities for industrial operations. Their comprehensive platform helps companies optimize equipment performance and reduce downtime through advanced monitoring and analytics. The company has raised $200 million in total funding, with their notable $120 million Series C led by Sapphire Ventures. Previous backers include prestigious investors General Catalyst, Next47, NGP Capital, and Y Combinator, reflecting strong confidence in their industrial AI solutions. * **Location:** Atlanta (Brazilian roots) * **Creation Date:** Not specified * **Sector:** Industrial Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Series C * **Total Funding:** USD 185.6M #### [Nintx](https://www.nintx.com.br/) Nintx translates inter-species biology from plants and microorganisms into multi-target therapies that act on biological pathways and gut microbiome modulation. Their innovative approach leverages natural biological mechanisms from Brazilian ecosystems to develop novel therapeutic solutions. Following a $3 million seed round in 2022, the biotech startup closed a $10 million Series A led by Brazilian investors Pitanga, Ecoa Capital, and MOV Investimentos. They also secured a $2.5 million FINEP grant, bringing total funding to $13 million and demonstrating strong validation of their therapeutic development approach. * **Location:** Brazil * **Creation Date:** 2021 * **Sector:** Biotechnology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Series A * **Total Funding:** USD 15M #### [Symbiomics](https://www.symbiomics.com.br/) Symbiomics utilizes advanced microbiome, genomic, and machine-learning platforms to develop biological products for sustainable agriculture. Their technology increases agricultural productivity while reducing reliance on traditional agrochemicals through biological innovation and carbon sequestration. With $4.11 million raised across multiple seed rounds, the company secured backing from The Yield Lab Latam, Vesper Ventures, MOV Investimentos, Baraúna Investimentos, and Ecoa Capital. Their most recent $2.15 million seed infusion in H1 2024 supports expansion of their sustainable agriculture platform. * **Location:** Florianópolis * **Creation Date:** 2021 * **Sector:** Biotechnology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Series A * **Total Funding:** USD 2M #### [FabNS](https://www.fabns.com.br/) FabNS develops advanced nanoscale analysis using TERS (Tip-Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy), combining patented nanoantenna tips with probe microscopy for chemical imaging with nanometric resolution. Their technology enables unprecedented precision in materials analysis at one-third of market price. Selected as a Deep Tech Pioneer in Hello Tomorrow's 2024 Challenge for Industry & Machines, the company was also recognized as MIT Innovators Under 35 and received Seed4Science support. This university spinoff from Federal University of Minas Gerais addresses critical needs in scientific instrumentation. * **Location:** Belo Horizonte * **Creation Date:** 2020 * **Sector:** Scientific Instrumentation * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Seed * **Total Funding:** N/A ### Chile #### [Photio](https://photio.cl/) Photio creates nanoparticle additives that transform urban surfaces into air purification agents, degrading atmospheric pollutants when exposed to light through synergistic photocatalysts. Their technology offers a scalable solution for passive urban air quality improvement. Selected as Deep Tech Pioneer & Track Winner in Hello Tomorrow's 2023 Challenge for Sustainable Construction & Infrastructure, the startup received Startup Chile Growth support and won Premio de Innovación PwC. Their CORFO Alumni status demonstrates strong validation in the environmental technology sector. * **Location:** Huechuraba * **Creation Date:** 2019 * **Sector:** Environmental Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Accelerator * **Total Funding:** N/A #### [Strong by Form](https://strongbyform.com/) Strong by Form uses bio-inspired digital manufacturing to create high-performance structural wood components through computational optimization and robotic manufacturing. Their proprietary processes enable wood products to replace traditional materials like steel, concrete, and aluminum in construction. Selected as Deep Tech Pioneer & Track Winner in Hello Tomorrow's 2022 Challenge for Sustainable Construction & Infrastructure, the company received Leonard SEED Program support and Latam Cleantech 25 recognition. Their CORFO Alumni status reinforces credibility in sustainable construction innovation. * **Location:** Santiago * **Creation Date:** 2018 * **Sector:** Construction Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 7 * **Stage:** Series A * **Total Funding:** USD 6.2M #### [Splight](https://www.splight.com/) Splight develops advanced grid operations AI technologies that address energy curtailment and grid congestion through innovative renewable energy resource management. Their platform optimizes electrical grid performance to maximize renewable energy integration efficiency. The energy AI startup raised $12 million in seed funding led by noa (formerly A/O), with participation from energy-focused investors including EDP Ventures, Elewit, Draper Cygnus, Ascent Energy Ventures, and UC Berkeley Foundation. This substantial seed round reflects strong investor interest in AI-powered energy solutions. * **Location:** Chile * **Creation Date:** Not specified * **Sector:** Energy Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** N/A * **Total Funding:** USD 26.1M ### Costa Rica #### [Establishment Labs](https://www.establishmentlabs.com/) Establishment Labs manufactures minimally invasive, next-generation breast implants under the Motiva Implants® brand, with 25 patents and 200 patent applications across 25 jurisdictions. The company distributes to over 70 countries and has established itself as a leader in medical device innovation. With $121 million raised across eight rounds and NASDAQ listing at $1.8 billion valuation, the company represents Latin America's most valuable medical technology venture. Key investors include Madryn Asset Management, JW Asset Management, and Crown Predator Holdings, with their $55 million Series D as the largest single round. * **Location:** Costa Rica * **Creation Date:** 2004 * **Sector:** Medical Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** IPO * **Total Funding:** USD 580.7M ### Mexico #### [Sistema.bio](https://sistema.bio/) Sistema.bio provides biodigester solutions for sustainable waste management and renewable energy generation, empowering farmers and rural communities while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Their technology converts organic waste into clean energy and nutrient-rich fertilizer across Latin America. Operating major hubs in Mexico and Colombia with partnerships in a dozen LATAM countries, the company raised $22.8 million across three Series B rounds between 2024-2025. Notable investors include KawiSafi, AXA Investment Managers, EcoEnterprises Fund, and Novastar Ventures, demonstrating strong support for their sustainable energy solutions. * **Location:** Mexico * **Creation Date:** Not specified * **Sector:** Clean Technology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 9 * **Stage:** Series B * **Total Funding:** USD 22.8M ### Uruguay #### [Antarka](https://www.antarka.bio/) Antarka develops DNA repair enzymes from Antarctic extremophile organisms for skincare applications, achieving 100% UV damage repair efficacy in ex vivo human skin using visible light-activated photolyases. Their biotechnology harnesses extreme environment adaptations for consumer cosmetic applications. Selected as Deep Tech Pioneer in Hello Tomorrow's 2023 Challenge for Medical Biotech & Pharmaceuticals, the startup received backing from SOSV/IndieBio and Grid Exponential. As a spinoff from Universidad de la República, they position themselves uniquely at the intersection of biotechnology and cosmetics innovation. * **Location:** Montevideo * **Creation Date:** 2023 * **Sector:** Biotechnology * **Tech Maturity:** TRL 8 * **Stage:** Accelerator * **Total Funding:** $400K --- ## Deep Tech Investment in LATAM: A promising but still nascent ecosystem By 2023, investment in LATAM increased by nearly 600% between 2019 and 2023—rising from under USD 300 million to USD 2 billion in just four years, according to the *Deep Tech: The New Wave* report by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)[^28]. As of September 2024, LATAM’s cumulative investment had grown by an additional USD 536 million, bringing the regional total to roughly USD 2.54 billion. Even at this higher level, LATAM still trails other regions: roughly USD 13 billion in Asia, USD 14 billion in Europe, and USD 52 billion in the United States[^29]. To place this in macroeconomic context, those volumes correspond to about 0.04% of Latin America’s GDP, versus approximately 0.08% in Europe, 0.20% in Asia, and 0.22% in the U.S. The per capita analysis provides additional context, showing Latin America's $15.25 per person investment, higher than Asia's modest $2.7, but still half of Europe's $31 and the United States' $153. This data illustrates that while other regions have more mature Deep Tech ecosystems, Latin America has an immense and largely untapped opportunity for both capital and innovation to drive the Deep Tech ecosystem. Looking ahead, the IDB projected in 2023 a twentyfold increase in VC investment into LATAM Deep Tech startups over the next decade, underpinned by a growing pool of researchers and engineers, cost advantages in technology development, lower early-stage valuations with attractive return profiles, and the region’s exceptional biodiversity. This growth trajectory shows no signs of slowing down. Back in 2023, the IDB estimated a 20x increase in VC investment into LAC Deep Tech startups over the next decade. The model rests on three points: Europe’s Deep Tech VC 18x growth from 2012 to 2022, LATAM’s general 20x VC growth between 2012-2022, and LATAM’s 1.8x Deep Tech growth from 2020 to 2022[^30]. The IDB attributes this potential to a growing pool of researchers and engineers, cost arbitrage in tech development, lower early-stage valuations with attractive return profiles, and the region’s exceptional biodiversity. We present this as a **high-end scenario**—credible but contingent on progress in talent retention, later-stage capital depth, regulatory coherence, and exit pathways, which will be explored in the following sections. In 2024, after 3 years of decline—primarily due to the pandemic and the “big tech crisis”—the funding landscape for LATAM tech startups appears to be showing positive signs once again. According to the *LATAM Startup Market 2024 in Review* report by SlingHub & Itaú, which tracks investment across sectors including fintech, Deep Tech, energy, and health tech, 2024 marked the first year since 2021 that LATAM’s tech industries experienced year-over-year growth, reaching 37%. In total, market funding across all tech sectors increased from $6.4 billion to $8.8 billion in the tech industry[^31]. For the authors of the report, this trend indicates that the regional innovation ecosystem is becoming more firmly established, spurred by rapid digital transformation and a rising demand for locally tailored technological solutions. While a steady recovery is on the horizon, it is likely to be accompanied by considerable volatility due to ongoing macroeconomic challenges. However, a closer examination of the data reveals that the Deep Tech segment is the most steadily growing area in LATAM. Overall, Deep Tech emerged as the third largest category within all tech industries, securing USD 536 million of funding, which represents 6% of the overall funding. This figure places Deep Tech just behind the energy sector, which accounted for 13%, and fintech, which dominated with 55% of the market funding. Nonetheless, although it’s a small percentage overall, the underlying figure is most significant, as Deep Tech is the sector that grew more year over year, accounting for a 219% overall growth increase. When looking at the total equity funding insights, the trend is similar: while Deep Tech lags significantly behind Fintech in terms of volume, amounting for 41%, and equals Energy at 11% respectively, Deep Tech was the highest year-over-year grower in terms of equity funding volume in 2024, with a 189% increase. These numbers underscore Deep Tech's significant, yet comparatively modest, presence in a highly competitive funding landscape. While the overall growth signals are promising, there are different funding gaps that remain the primary challenge for the Deep Tech ecosystem in LATAM identified by most stakeholders we interviewed—especially when it comes to securing capital for rounds beyond pre-seed. ### Gaps to Become International Unicorns While Deep Tech in LATAM boasts exciting pockets, the region remains dramatically undercapitalized. R&D funding is roughly 13× lower than in China and 70× lower than in the U.S., throttling growth and leaving many breakthroughs stranded on the launchpad[^32]. This shortfall seems to be structural. In advanced economies like the US and the EU, companies fund over 60% of R&D (nearly 80% in China). In LATAM, businesses cover only about 35%, while governments provide roughly 60%. The hurdles run deep. Among investors, they include skepticism toward regional R&D to uneven clinical phases and fragmented regulatory frameworks; and on the company side, issues like a local-only mindset, lack of standardized metrics, weak narratives, and no regional coalition to forge ties with global backers. In the sections that follow, we’ll unpack each of these funding gaps and chart practical steps to help LATAM’s Deep Tech champions become tomorrow’s global unicorns. --- ## From the LATAM Discount to Fair Value The "LATAM Discount" refers to the phenomenon where startups and companies in Latin America are often valued lower than their counterparts in other regions, such as the United States, Europe or other emerging markets, despite having similar or even superior metrics. This discount is attributed to perceived risks, including political instability, economic volatility, and regulatory challenges, which can deter international investors. Even in traditional equities markets, Latin American equities have traded at a significant discount to global averages and Emerging Markets (EM) in the last years. **The MSCI Latam Index, which captures large and mid cap representation in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, suggests LATAM is trading at -51% Discount compared to the world, above the historical average of -13.9%**. According to Itaú BBVA analysis, “this can be partially explained by the rising relevance of tech companies in global indexes, at a higher pace than EMs, while LATAM has virtually little exposure to this sector”. When comparing the region to the Emerging Markets, LATAM countries are trading at a higher discount as well, a -27.7% Discount as of 2024[^33]. When looking at the factors that drive the risks and returns, the 2025 MSCI Index compares the factor exposures of LATAM and other EMs like China or India against a global benchmark (MSCI ACWI IMI)[^34] The 6 main factors are Value, Low Size, Momentum, Quality, Yield and Low Volatility of investments. A positive value means the index is overexposed to that factor compared to the global average, while a negative value indicates underexposure. From the 6 main factors identified, LATAM is especially overexposed to Volatility, represented by commodity exposure, macroeconomic swings and political risks, amongst others. This is typically negative, and can deter global equities investors in the short and long term. In parallel, LATAM lags behind other emerging markets and the global benchmark, which indicates fewer high-quality balance sheets or fewer stocks with strong price momentum compared to the global average. Finally, it’s also worth noting the exposure to the Low Size factors. A negative Low Size tilt suggests the index is more concentrated in large-cap stocks. Being negative means both LatAm and other EM indexes lean towards bigger companies compared to the global benchmark. In general, this phenomenon brings us to the pivotal question: **why bother investing in emerging markets (EMs)?** After all, investors might comfortably remain in the U.S., where returns are stable and fixed income rates currently exceed 5%. As one market observer put it, “the big issue seems to be whether emerging returns are enough to drag U.S. and Western funds away from an increasingly comfortable ‘home bias’—pampered as they now are by high domestic fixed-income yields and deterred by seismic geopolitical risks in a year marked by crucial elections and military tensions”[^35]. Nevertheless, while this skepticism is understandable, this report and broader data indicates compelling reasons to invest precisely at this juncture. Factors such as intrinsic regional growth, evolving regulatory frameworks, the increasingly critical role of technology, and LATAM's competitive advantages present an opportunity for valuation re-rating toward fair value as these structural improvements materialize." The key insight for investors is recognizing that LATAM's discount represents a **temporary mispricing** driven by solvable structural factors—regulatory uncertainty, limited market liquidity, and information asymmetries—rather than permanently inferior fundamentals. As these factors improve through institutional development, enhanced transparency, and deeper capital markets, the region's valuations should converge toward their intrinsic value, creating attractive risk-adjusted returns without requiring speculative premium valuations. > As succinctly articulated by Cristian Hernández, manager at Zentynel, a VC fund active in LATAM, the question is shifting from “Why Latin America?” to “Why haven’t we invested more?”[^36]. --- ## Recommendations: Closing the LATAM Discount in Deep Tech *Strategic Recommendations to De-risk and Scale Deep Tech in LATAM* ### Market Readiness 1. **Venture Building–Train, Fund, Validate:** Scientific founders often lack key entrepreneurial skills. Launch structured matchmaking initiatives to form balanced co-founding teams, ensuring world-class science is paired with strategic leadership from and a robust network of VCs and CVCs from day one. 2. **Metrics & Success Stories–Deep Tech KPI framework:** Investor skepticism often arises from a lack of performance data and tangible success narratives about LATAM’s Deep Tech ventures. Collect, validate, and publicize key metrics (e.g., IRR, exit multiples, time-to-market) alongside high-impact regional case studies to illustrate Deep Tech ROI potential and enable like-for-like comparisons across markets. 3. **Showcase & Visibility– Educate Privately, Convene Publicly:** Robust data is the beginning. Limited understanding of Deep Tech investment constrains funding availability and delays strategic capital deployment. Launch targeted educational initiatives for VCs, family offices, and CVCs to demystify Deep Tech fundamentals, showcase regional ROI data, and build confidence for larger, strategic funding commitments. 4. **Impact-Driven Narratives–Deep Tech for SDGs:** Lab-driven founders often default to dense technical explanations Embed structured storytelling programs (inspired by Zentynel’s narrative-coaching playbook) to translate complex science into clear, emotionally resonant stories of global impact, turning bench-top breakthroughs into funding catalysts. Embedding institutional frameworks like the Sustainable Development Goals is a plus. 5. **Global Mindset–Language First, Structure Next:** Small markets, fragmented rules, FX volatility, and language barriers nudge founders toward local-first. From day one, require English upskilling for founders and technical leads and adopt English-first artifacts (pitch, website, data room, others) to signal world-class readiness. In parallel, implement international structures—Delaware/UK holding with local subsidiaries, early USPTO/EPO filings—to reduce diligence friction and speed cross-border commercialization. ### Investors Readiness 6. **R&D Skepticism–Regional International Scientific Advisory Boards:** Persistent doubts about LATAM’s early-stage science slow diligence and capital. Establish vertical-specific Regional International Scientific Advisory Boards that pair global experts with top LATAM scientists to run TRL-3–5 peer reviews (experimental design, reproducibility, IP robustness), issue endorsement seals, and provide targeted support (protocol refinement, regulatory strategy), plus an annual “State of Deep Tech Science” brief to broadcast validated breakthroughs and de-risked tech. 7. **Uneven Clinical Trials–Alignment Through Interoperability:** Early-stage Deep Tech ventures often struggle to attract international capital due to country-specific regulations. Adopt a “global-first” compliance strategy—aligning products and processes with rigorous frameworks like the FDA / EMA. In parallel, explore parallel jurisdictions like Special Economic Zones to compress permit cycles. Furthermore, advocate for mutual-recognition mechanisms between LATAM states for selected scientific approvals. 8. **Regulatory Portability–The 34th Regime:** LATAM’s policy landscape is a patchwork. Champion a voluntary, pan-LATAM “34th Regime” single-startup status—modeled on Europe’s 28th—for mutual recognition, regional sandboxes, standardized digital filings, and portable approvals; constitute via a plurilateral (CELAC/Pacific Alliance); pilot on existing rails (digital ID/e-signatures, Mercosur–Pacific Alliance MRAs); and design Deep-Tech-specific procurement to reduce diligence friction and speed scale-up. 9. **Corporate Venture Capital–Matchmaking Bridges & Observatory:** CVC backup is no longer optional. Stand up a neutral, region-wide CVC Bridge to professionalize matchmaking through sector pitch days and roadshows, diligence-ready data-room templates, and pilots on corporate testbeds. Partner with a multilateral to co-finance targeted SME 8-12week pilot programs. Anchor it with a CVC×Deep Tech Observatory tracking participation/depth, time-to-deal, survival and time-to-next-round, and procurement-conversion—turning ad-hoc encounters into a predictable pipeline of strategic capital and first customers. 10. **Social Clusters–Guilds & Ecosystem-as-a-Service:** R&D must be paired with social infrastructure. Beyond shared labs, build curated, mixed domestic–international founder cohorts and consolidate Ecosystem-as-a-Service operators that convene academia, founders, corporates, policymakers, and governments; run recurring peer forums and clinics (technical, regulatory, BD/fundraising) and maintain warm-intro circuits. This networked layer accelerates learning and collaboration—and seeds tomorrow’s deep-tech investors from today’s founders. ### Regional Coalition LATAM’s Deep Tech future won’t be unlocked by isolated wins. We need a neutral, mission-driven coalition that spans countries and verticals. It must seat public institutions, academia, founders, capital, and corporations at one table with shared cadence and metrics. Think of the European Union, minus the bureaucracy, to act as one market for talent, capital, and scale—so breakthroughs travel region-wide, fast. This is the coalition the LADP proposes to build, and the lens through which our recommendations should be read. 11. **Anchor Public R&D to a Sovereign-Tech Agenda** – Fragmented and short-term public-funding limits LATAM’s strategic impact. Work with public institutions to place strategic Deep Tech fields on the same footing as critical infrastructure, rolling out upgrades to Special Economic Zones, 1:1 matching-funds, and sovereign co-investment vehicles that channel long-term R&D budgets. 12. **Pensions–A Fund-of-Funds for Domestic Deep Tech:** On top of public funding, establish an independently managed fund-of-funds that mobilizes a slice of pension assets into domestic Deep Tech via vetted specialist GPs. Modeled after France’s Tibi initiative and the UK’s Mansion House reforms, advocate for local co-investment and procurement links—turning public budgets into catalytic patient capital and giving trustees a de-risked, rules-based path to back science-based scale-ups at home. 13. **Geopolitical Lens–Strategical Autonomy:** The tech order is being reordered—China’s scale-up, U.S.–EU realignments, and the rise of middle powers create parallel tracks for capital, supply chains, and standards. To ensure LATAM gains autonomy rather than dependency in the emerging Deep Tech order, establish a dedicated working group to map flows, stress-test partnerships, and broker corridors (SEZs, joint labs, procurement pilots, standards MOUs) with superpowers and Middle Powers alike. Publish quarterly heatmaps and deal playbooks so LATAM can pick de-risked pathways to preserve technological autonomy. 14. **Research & Visibility–Open Data Commons & Grants Portal:** LATAM lacks a shared evidence base and a clear window into non-dilutive capital. Build an open-access data commons—standardized stats, deal/IP registries, dashboards, and white papers/case studies—to cut diligence friction and enable evidence-based narratives; in parallel, launch a unified grants portal that normalizes funding types, ticket sizes, eligibility, and deadlines, paired with workshops and AI application assistants, so founders and policymakers can find, compare, and win capital faster. 15. **Forge a Pan-LATAM Deep-Tech Forum:** LATAM’s event surge is fragmented; launch a single, rotating flagship co-branded by leading funds, accelerators, and alliances to pool sponsors, attract international LPs/CVCs, and project one regional narrative. Anchor the forum with annual KPI releases (deals, pilots, grants, cross-border expansions) so it becomes the region’s measurable, go-to platform for deep-tech scale. --- ### Market Readiness for Deep Tech Companies Whatever the source of funding—whether public, venture capital, angel investors, or corporate venture capital—another challenge consistently identified in our research to bridge the funding gaps for Deep Tech in LATAM is the perceived **market readiness** of individual projects. This issue runs deep and flows in both directions. On one hand, startups often lack the crucial market and business readiness needed to effectively secure investment. On the other hand, investors frequently lack a sufficient understanding of Deep Tech, resulting in a significant knowledge gap that deters them to commit the necessary capital. This scenario sets up a classic chicken-and-egg paradox: **does substantial groundwork from Deep Tech startups to attract funding come first, or does adequate funding precede the ability to conduct meaningful Deep Tech development?** Throughout our investigation, we've mapped out qualitative pain points that shed light on the complexities of market readiness from the startup perspective and investor readiness from the funding side. Strategies proposed to bridge these gaps range from shifting the narrative startups use during pitches—emphasizing broader impact rather than just technology—to comprehensive educational programs aimed at demystifying Deep Tech investments and dispelling persistent misconceptions. Several projects in the region have successfully incorporated these strategies for years, generating valuable learnings and experiences. Yet, stakeholders unanimously highlight a critical missing element: the absence of a unified coalition capable of aligning and amplifying these individual efforts at a regional level. Establishing such a coalition is not just beneficial—it's essential. #### Venture Building: The Science-to-Startup Pipeline One of the most critical challenges for Deep Tech startups lies in bridging the gap between scientific innovation and business execution. Many ventures are founded by brilliant scientists who, while exceptionally skilled in research and technology development, often face a steep learning curve when shifting into entrepreneurial leadership roles. Making the transition from academia to business is rarely quick—and even when successfully navigated, founders encounter broader structural barriers in the region. In Latin America, for example, multinational companies tend to conduct little R&D locally, and large domestic firms often replicate innovation models from developed markets rather than investing in homegrown research. As a result, scientific founders are left to juggle multiple high-stakes roles at once: raising capital, taking their products to international markets, and continuing to push technological frontiers. The weight of these demands makes it nearly impossible for one person to manage alone, highlighting the urgent need for Deep Tech startups to build multidisciplinary teams that integrate world-class science with strategic business leadership from the outset. This disconnect is further rooted in the academic culture of many universities across the region, where entrepreneurship is still seen as a niche path rather than a viable or encouraged career option for scientific talent. Most researchers are trained to pursue academic excellence or institutional careers, not to build companies. As a result, the entrepreneurial potential of highly skilled scientists remains largely untapped. Venture Building, also called a venture studio, is a model tailored to fit this gap. Nominally, it’s an institutional co-founder model that originates startups from scratch, not just accelerates existing ones. A venture builder scouts frontier science/IP, forms founding teams by pairing scientists with seasoned operators, structures the company (IP, governance, regulatory), provides shared product/BD resources, and co-invests to reach the first meaningful technical and commercial milestones. Unlike incubators/accelerators (which offer time-bound programming), venture builders are hands-on company creators with longer engagement, deeper ownership, and operational responsibility. **Regional Examples:** ##### GRIDX’s MatchMaking Model **GridX** is a pioneering venture capital firm and company builder that is reshaping the Deep Tech and biotech landscape in Latin America. With a bold thesis rooted in science-first innovation, GridX has raised **US$41.5 million** across two funds and built a portfolio of **81 companies**, **75% co-founded by women**[^37]. These ventures span multiple countries in the region—including Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile—and collectively employ **1,000 people**, including **700 scientists**. At the heart of GridX’s model is its **matchmaking process**—a deliberate, rigorous approach to pair scientific founders with experienced business leaders. First, GridX identifies scientists not only with credible research, but with the drive to become entrepreneurs. In parallel, it recruits business professionals capable of executing in unfamiliar industries and supporting a long-term scientific vision. These pairs then undergo a **three-month trial phase**, testing compatibility and mutual understanding. If the match proves strong, GridX invests and helps build the company from the ground up. This approach began as an experiment. After mapping hundreds of projects and co-founding six initial ventures, GridX raised a **US$1 million prototype fund in 2016**. With the early backing of influential investors like Hugo Sigman and others from Grupo Insud, Bago, and Gador, GridX formally launched its model. By 2018, the success of its early companies allowed the team to raise **a US$10 million Fund I**. Then in **2022**, with increased traction and the **Inter-American Development Bank’s Lab (IDB Lab)** joining as a limited partner, GridX launched **Fund II**, securing an additional **US$30 million**. To date, GRIDX’s companies have raised **over US$100 million** from international investors and achieved their first exit, validating the long-term potential of the model. ##### Vesper Venture: Co-Founding with Scientists **Vesper Ventures** is a Brazilian venture builder focused on transforming high-impact scientific research into globally scalable startups. Unlike traditional venture capital firms that invest in existing companies, Vesper takes a hands-on approach by partnering with scientists at the earliest stages—often before a company even exists. At the heart of Vesper’s strategy is its **co-founding model**, which involves directly engaging with universities and academic institutions to identify promising scientific talent and breakthrough ideas. Then, Vesper proactively seeks out researchers with strong entrepreneurial drive and works alongside them to form founding teams, shape business models, and guide product development. Their numbers are eloquent: after evaluating approximately **4,500 scientific projects**, Vesper chose to **co-found 8 companies**. Yet the impact of these ventures is significant—they collectively hold **16 patents**, have raised over **US$30 million**, and bring together a team of more than **50 PhDs**. ##### Odisea Labs: Education, Acceleration, and In-house Investment Odisea Labs is a LATAM-based innovation lab focused on advancing **AI and Cryptography** that integrates education, company building, and capital deployment under one roof. **Founded in 2021**, Odisea’s thesis starts one step earlier than typical venture builders: Through **NÚCLEO**, its flagship technical academy, Odisea trains talent in applied AI and cryptography, including non-experts and candidates from nontraditional academic paths. In parallel, Odisea Labs runs **incubation and accelerator programs** for regional and global startups, giving Núcleo graduates a **fast track into entrepreneurship**—from education to venture formation, product validation, and investor readiness. To date, Odisea has **worked with 100 teams** at the AI–cryptography intersection through its programs. Collectively, these teams have gone on to raise over USD 100 million, from some of the leading cryptography and AI investors globally. Closing the loop, Odisea is **finalizing its first venture fund** to invest in the companies it helps build and the founders it trains—creating a continuous **“learn–build–invest” flywheel** designed to retain talent in the region and compress the time from frontier research to market deployment. #### Recommendations: Train, Fund, Validate Stakeholders recommend starting with the basics: **normalize entrepreneurship inside universities and top labs**. Make it routine—run short, hands-on founder bootcamps and add recurring entrepreneurship modules to graduate programs, with mentors who can pair scientists with operators. The aim is straightforward: **more scientist-led spinouts with the right co-founders from day one**. We must provide universities and their stakeholders with the right incentives for them to engage with company building aimed at advancing Deep Tech in the region; this involves circulating economic value back to the institutions, fostering an environment where entrepreneurship is celebrated in academia, and encouraging students to participate in new venture creation in their institutions. A parallel demand emerged for increased non-dilutive capital in the initial stages. Stakeholders consistently requested small grants and rapid bridge funding to support proof-of-concepts and early validations **before** Series A. While it's true that later funding rounds are the scarcest in LATAM, as previously discussed, without this early Proof of Concept funding, there will be no credible projects for subsequent financing. Although it might seem counterintuitive, venture builders insisted that the earliest stages are crucial for discovering exceptional talent. Finally, to facilitate early-stage Deep Tech venture building, stakeholders called to connect venture builders with VCs and corporates. This collaboration can secure funding for critical stages such as clinical trials, pilots, and initial market entry. Establishing dedicated corporate pilot lanes (at least one per hub) would enable product validation in real-world environments. Furthermore, implementing shared diligence and data-room templates, alongside a quarterly selection process, would accelerate the advancement of the most promising projects. #### Metrics and Success Stories In the process of fundraising and building investor confidence, clear, tailored metrics and compelling success stories are essential tools for Deep Tech startups. Unlike software or other “soft tech” ventures, where traction is often measured by user growth, churn rates, or recurring revenue, Deep Tech operates on fundamentally different timelines and value drivers. One of the key hurdles startups face when engaging with investors is the **lack of standardized, relevant metrics** for evaluating Deep Tech performance. Applying the same indicators used in traditional tech sectors often leads to misunderstandings and undervaluation. Instead, metrics must be **contextualized according to each specific vertical**—for example, a biotech startup will need different benchmarks than a startup focused on quantum computing or advanced materials. Even within biotech, performance indicators should vary across sub-segments: a company working on alternative proteins in the food sector will follow a very different trajectory than one developing therapeutic molecules. As discussed during LADP’s investor roundtable, many global investors remain unconvinced by Latin America’s Deep Tech track record. As one participant emphasized, “one key element missing is a concrete track record that shows Latin American companies have global reach and impact. Track records are super important for investors. While there are isolated examples, the overall image and history of successful exits in the region remain limited”. ##### Recommendations: Deep Tech KPI framework The main pillar for this endeavor is robust data. We recommend establishing a LATAM Deep Tech KPI framework to close the gap left by U.S. and EU-centric benchmarks and to improve the transparency and comparability of investment opportunities across the region. This report offers a first pass of data; moving from map to machinery will require follow-on convenings—working groups of investors, founders, and technical experts—to validate gaps, agree on relevant sources, and set clear data-collection cadences. The framework should combine a standardized, cross-vertical core with sector-specific annexes. The standardized core would track items such as graduation rates from one funding round to the next, internal rate of return over defined time horizons, and the share and depth of active corporate venture capital participation, to mention a few—metrics that enable like-for-like comparison across markets. Sector annexes would then capture what general KPIs miss: clinical and regulatory milestones in biotech, certification and qualification cycles in hardware, or approvals and interconnection timelines in climate and energy. This two-tier approach preserves comparability while capturing each vertical’s operational realities. For startups, it creates a credible, investor-ready narrative grounded in standardized metrics. For the broader ecosystem, it will generate a stronger evidence base—producing the robust numbers and decision-grade insights needed to elevate the region’s standing in the global Deep Tech landscape. #### Showcase & Visibility Robust data is the first step. Second and maybe most important is communicating them to the appropriate stakeholders in the appropriate time, publicly and privately. Privately, it is equally essential to educate investors on the viability and strategic significance of —an area traditionally absent from their investment considerations–and more so around LATAM’s. Although education requires significant effort, patience, and a strategic vision, stakeholders highlighted that it holds great potential for guiding future LPs, family offices, and other investors toward more informed and confident decisions. Our research underscored another missing link: this information gap also includes local, off-the-radar investors. As noted by one participant, regions like southern Argentina harbor considerable, long-accumulated wealth—often tied to oil, agriculture, and mining—yet many local capital stewards lack exposure to alternative asset classes such as startups and Deep Tech. To overcome this critical gap, the LATAM Deep Tech ecosystem needs a more concerted effort of holding meetings with investors across the region to provide them with the necessary context to allocate capital into new technology verticals. Publicly, a mosaic of initiatives—from podcasts and newsletters to demo days and national summits—works in parallel to publicly spotlight Deep Tech talent. Notable examples include EMERGE’s **Deep Tech Summit** in São Paulo (launched in 2024)[^38]; **Impacto Deep Tech LATAM**, co-hosted on Uruguay’s coast by CITES, Draper Cygnus, GridX, Air Capital VC, and The Ganesha Lab with IDB Lab support**[^39]**; **Draper Cygnus Tech Week 2025** across the Southern Cone; GRIDX’s 2025 **U.S. Biotech Roadshow** (Tulsa, New York, San Francisco)**[^40]**; Alianza Deep Tech Colombia’s Genera Summit in Bogotá (inaugurated in 2024, returning in 2025)**[^41]**; and The Ganesha Lab’s BIGinBIO (Chile, now in its 10th cohort) alongside CORFO’s Go Europe Connect (Chile–EU, 2025 edition)**[^42]**. These initiatives are genuine wins—each actor is doing the necessary work of pushing local founders onto global stages. Yet as the ecosystem expands, efforts that run program-by-program and country-by-country can drift into duplication, thin signaling, and missed network effects for lack of a unifying architecture. ##### Recommendations: Educate Privately, Convene Publicly Participants converged on a central challenge: moving from isolated efforts to a unified push that both educates local and international investors in private settings and convenes stakeholders around a single flagship forum. On the private side, governments, corporations, and regional stakeholders can institute dedicated Deep Tech investor-education initiatives—formal and informal—that address capital requirements, R&D timelines, exit strategies, and sector-specific success metrics. In parallel, by designing targeted education and engagement programs for high-net-worth individuals—both in traditional financial hubs and beyond—the region can cultivate a new class of angel investors and channel fresh capital into Latin America’s most disruptive innovations. This education should not rely on theory alone. Real-world examples are essential: startups that have secured follow-on rounds, provided substantial returns for funds, entered regulated markets, or translated scientific breakthroughs into commercial products serve as proof points that demystify the Deep Tech journey and build credibility in a space where uncertainty is high and timelines are long. Publicly, the goal is to convene a single flagship Deep Tech forum—not a routine conference, but a marquee gathering that places Latin America squarely on the global investment map. Beyond product launches, the event should articulate what Deep Tech is and why the region’s science matters: returning diaspora founders who pair world-class R&D with local insight; breakthroughs in biotech, climate tech, and space tech that can scale into developed markets; and a talent base priced for global competitiveness. A curated mix of exhibitions, keynote sessions, and investor roadshows would showcase these strengths, while an intentional invitation strategy ensures the room includes international LPs and strategic corporations—not only regional insiders. Crucially, this forum should anchor a broader coalition agenda, spawning regular meet-ups, cross-border newsletters, and targeted investor-education tracks to sustain momentum. Finally, a coalition is needed to align calendars, share data and deal-flow standards, and speak with one credible demand signal to investors and corporations. Coordinated under a shared strategy, today’s scattered sparks would cohere into a region-wide beacon—making the true scale and investability of Latin America’s frontier science unmistakable to the world. #### Shifting the Narrative Once Deep Tech startups have successfully aligned scientific innovation with business structure and begin fundraising beyond initial grants, a critical next step is to **strategically reframe how they present their value proposition**. Participants in our research repeatedly emphasized the importance of moving beyond a purely technical narrative—often focused on scientific complexity or engineering novelty—toward a more impactful and globally relevant story. This narrative shift involves positioning Deep Tech as a vehicle for addressing **some of the most pressing global challenges** of our time, including climate change, energy transition, and public health. As Cristian Hernández —general manager at Zentynel and author of the book *Catalysts of Change[^43]*–argues, the savviest biotech investors don’t merely analyse spreadsheets—they buy into stories. “Facts alone don’t move hearts — or wallets. Investors, regulators, and partners must not only understand the science but also feel the urgency and potential impact of what a company is building.” The stumbling block, Hernández notes, is that many lab-driven founders struggle to translate bench-top breakthroughs into a narrative that resonates beyond technical circles. The ventures that secure marquee partnerships and oversubscribed rounds are those that recast complex research as a clear, compelling answer to big-picture challenges in health, agriculture, or industry. That said, Deep Tech investment isn't merely about traditional philanthropy or mission-driven initiatives. Participants emphasized that **Deep Tech can deliver substantial ROI**, with its long-term value stemming from its capacity to resolve significant challenges while simultaneously generating returns. Many investors today are drawn to this hybrid appeal—they want more than just financial gain, but they are not willing to compromise on performance. Deep tech, when framed correctly, offers both. ##### Recommendations: Deep Tech for SDGs From the outset, think beyond technology and pure investment. Deep tech can directly address climate change, inequality, and multiple SDGs through its scientific and commercial breakthroughs. Yes, engineering excellence and go-to-market strategy matter to investors; however, we recommend situating those strengths within clear societal outcomes—without slipping into greenwashing. In fact, institutionally, the 2025 United Nations Development Programme’s report *Global Deep Tech Ecosystems* opens with “Why Deep Tech Matters for the Sustainable Development Goals,”[^44] including case studies on solid-state battery technologies and global challenges. We recommend using these frameworks when pitching and when designing relevant institutional approaches. As the Deep Tech agenda gains visibility and legitimacy, startups will be able to **leverage their mission as a strategic asset**, differentiating themselves in a crowded fundraising landscape and attracting long-term partners who are aligned with their global ambitions. #### Global Mindset and Operations First For Deep Tech startups in Latin America, adopting a global mindset from day one is not just an advantage—it’s a necessity. While the region holds immense scientific talent and raw potential, local markets are simply not large or stable enough to support the scale that breakthrough ventures require. Whether due to limited ambition or barriers such as language—particularly difficulties with English—many founders still build with a local frame of reference. However, as participants in our research emphasized, there needs to be a fundamental shift in perspective: startups must be designed with **global relevance from the outset**, positioning their technologies and business models to compete on the international stage. Yet mindset alone is not sufficient. **Operational readiness must go hand in hand with global thinking.** This means aligning company structures with international standards to attract foreign capital and strategic partners. ##### Recommendations: Language First, Structure Next Start with the basics. We suggest making English the working language for internal and external materials—pitch decks, data rooms, technical docs, and contracts. Pair this with targeted English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) upskilling for founders and research teams, focusing on the vocabulary and formats they’ll actually use: IP and licensing terms, term sheets, regulatory and clinical/device documentation, and investor pitching. Provide operational support such as English-ready data-room templates, bilingual model contracts, and translation/interpretation stipends for diligence and roadshows. Once those fundamentals are in place, layer in the structural elements that signal global readiness. Best practices include ​ setting up **holding companies in jurisdictions like Delaware, United States**, which is widely favored by international investors for its robust legal framework, business-friendly regulations, and transparent corporate governance. In parallel, stakeholders also suggest registering their intellectual property early with the **United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)**—the federal agency responsible for granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks–as it provides strong legal protection in one of the world’s largest markets but also enhances credibility with investors and partners. In fact, it's often recommended to patent in the U.S. before filing in home countries, as it establishes a stronger foundation for future international patent extensions. Another recommended route is leveraging the **Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)** for broader, cost-effective IP protection. By submitting a single PCT application—recognized by 158 member states—founders can secure “time-buys” to nationalize their patent filings across multiple jurisdictions, preserving rights while postponing major translation and filing fees. Unfortunately, only 14 out of 33 LATAM countries are registered, Uruguay being the latest signatory[^45]. Together, these practices demonstrate that a startup is not only building cutting-edge technology but also structuring itself to **operate and thrive on a global stage**. --- ### LATAM Discount in Deep Tech Let’s flip the script on the chicken-and-egg problem. Instead of fixating on the market-readiness boxes startups must tick to attract capital, in the following sections we assess the pre-existing regional conditions that deter financing to emerge—and, crucially, **investor readiness**: why VCs, corporates, family offices, and even sovereign funds may hesitate to commit the necessary, patient capital in the first place. During our roundtable with investors, the **LATAM Discount** emerged as the single most cited factor explaining the persistent funding gaps in the region’s Deep Tech ecosystem. The core argument was consistently clear: despite the regional ecosystem demonstrating comparable conditions to global standards in terms of talent, innovation, and growth potential, valuations for LATAM Deep Tech ventures often remain significantly lower, a matter of considerable frustration as they believe their portfolios demonstrate sufficient strength for competition on a global scale. Within the discussion, participants specifically explored the underlying reasons driving this valuation gap in the Deep Tech sector, identifying key issues such as **skepticism toward LATAM’s R&D capabilities**, a **disjointed regulatory landscape**, and **extended, uneven clinical trial phases** across different countries. While we list specific factors that perpetuate the Discount in Deep Tech, there is currently **no standardized, MSCI-style index** to prioritize remedies or track progress across these items. Future research should develop a **repeatable measurement framework** for the LATAM Discount in Deep Tech—disaggregated by sector and time horizon, amongst others—to quantify valuation gaps and related frictions (e.g., cost of capital, time-to-approval/exit, regulatory burden). Such a metric would provide the empirical basis for sharper investment theses and targeted policy interventions. ### Skepticism Towards LATAM’s R&D Among the chief pain points identified were skepticism toward LATAM’s R&D capabilities and a fragmented regulatory landscape; meanwhile, the main recommendations to advance included promoting cross-border regulatory innovation, and building a stronger regional coalition with global reach Deep tech companies rely extensively on R&D at top-tier academic institutions. In fact, their defining characteristic is that they emerge after years of rigorous research and experimentation carried out by individual scientists or teams of PhDs, in many cases. This process involves the development of robust intellectual property and a lengthy, strategic technology transfer from academia to the commercial sector, setting the foundation for groundbreaking, commercial innovation. This process is long, though. The entire journey—from research and prototyping, through development, validation, and finally commercialization—takes 25-40% longer to translate into returns for investors if compared to the time-horizon of a conventional software company, according to estimates by the Boston Consulting Group[^46]. However, before even thinking about commercialization, the primary risk at these early stages is the robustness of the underlying science of ventures. It is at this very early stage that some regional investors raised a flag: Many times, Latin American ventures often face **skepticism from international investors regarding the robustness and credibility of their early-stage scientific research, doubting whether the underlying science is sound enough to support scalable, global business models**. While this issue is difficult to quantify, it is far from new. In 2024, Garret Dempsey—a global investor active in across both the U.S. and LATAM—highlighted the challenge: “U.S. investors, accustomed to evaluating founders and technologies emerging from prestigious institutions like Stanford, MIT, and Harvard, might doubt the credibility of innovations presented by founders from lesser-known universities in LatAm. This skepticism forces founders to undertake the additional challenge of proving the reliability of their technology and data.” Consequently, this skepticism often results in an extended deliberation process for international investors—sometimes even perceived as biased—at a crucial stage in the development of companies. #### Recommendation: Regional International Scientific Advisory Boards To enhance credibility and accelerate investment decisions, we recommend establishing Regional International Scientific Advisory Boards within each major vertical. These boards will serve as impartial, high-caliber validation panels, combining global expertise—from senior scientists and technology-transfer officers at institutions such as MIT, Stanford, ETH Zurich and Cambridge—with the local insight of distinguished LATAM researchers who have proven commercialization track records. To ground the boards in excellence, they should include leaders from Latin America’s top patent-producing academic institutions, such as[^47]: * **Brazil:** Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Unicamp), Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG) * **Mexico:** Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN) * **Chile:** Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Universidad de Concepción * **Colombia:** Universidad de los Andes * **Argentina:** CONICET These boards could conduct rigorous peer reviews of early-stage ventures at Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 3–5, evaluating experimental design, reproducibility and intellectual-property robustness. Ventures that meet these benchmarks could receive a formal endorsement seal for use in investor materials, alongside tailored expert support—ranging from refining experimental protocols to crafting regulatory strategies for clinical or field trials—and policy support, if needed. Finally, the advisory boards could publish an annual “State of Deep Tech Science” briefing that highlights validated breakthroughs and de-risked technologies, distributing this report to key investor networks and governmental institutions. Depending on needs, the Boards can be housed **(1)** within a multilateral institution (e.g., the Inter-American Development Bank) for convening power and credibility; **(2)** in an intergovernmental academic body amplify scientific legitimacy and dissemination (e.g., the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research, which comprises 19 regional member states, with an established annual forum and Deep Tech-relevant associates like Brazilian FAPESP[^48]); **(3)** under a consortium of leading LATAM academic institutions; or **(4)** within a newly established, neutral committee run by an ecosystem enabler such as the Latin American Dynamism Project or the proposed Regional Deep Tech Coalition. The hosting model naturally informs the financing architecture. Viable options include public–private partnerships, multilateral and philanthropic grants, and program-tied corporate sponsorships (especially for vertical-specific calls and reviews). To attract and retain top-tier advisors, the package should mix financial honoraria with non-financial incentives—formal recognition, authorship/attribution in the annual brief or data-access agreements, amongst others, plus opportunities to mentor funded cohorts. This alignment ensures sustainability while preserving independence and scientific standards. By institutionalizing this advisory board, Latin America’s Deep Tech ecosystem can empower founders to demonstrate scientific rigor and give international investors the confidence to shorten due-diligence cycles and deploy capital earlier into the region’s most promising ventures. ### Extended, Uneven Clinical Trial Phases LATAM does not have a centralized regulatory agency that oversees the trial phases and market readiness of, say, emerging biotech or AgTech innovations looking to come to market. Each country operates under its own set of rules and timelines, making the navigation process both challenging and essential for success. As detailed by Cristian Hernández, Zentynel’s General Partner, a drug approval in Chile can take between 6 to 8 months for its review by public agencies, in contrast to the 1.5 to 2 years that it may take the Brazilian, Mexican or Colombian equivalent public agencies. Below is an overview of the regulatory framework different countries have in the region specifically for Biotech[^49]: * **Brazil — ANVISA.** Historically 18–24 months post-submission; reforms aim for 120–365 days for innovative therapies, but separate GMP certification can add months. * **Mexico — COFEPRIS.** The equivalence route is officially 5–60 days, yet backlogs often extend approvals to 1–2 years, prompting some firms to seek legal remedies. * **Colombia — INVIMA.** Typically 12–18 months; flexible use of foreign data and SME incentives ease entry for companies with US/EU dossiers. * **Chile — ISP.** Predictable 6–8 month reviews; smaller market but a transparent, strategic first stop for biologics, diagnostics, and precision medicine. * **Argentina — ANMAT.** Since 2017, clinical-trial evaluations have been cut from ~160 to ≤70 business days, though incomplete documentation can still cause delays. For international investors, this augments the risk of investing, as it may not be strategic to back an early-stage startup that only complies with regulations of a single country, thus impeding their regional and global expansion. #### Recommendations: Global-First Alignment Through Interoperability To bypass this hurdle, regional investors interviewed for this report stated that they have been encouraging the startups in their portfolio to work with a global-first approach from the beginning, like the FDA or EMA, to immediately meet international standards for trial phases. By aligning their products and processes with FDA regulatory frameworks, companies can signal adherence to rigorous, internationally recognized standards. This could make Deep Tech ventures considerably more attractive to global investors by reducing perceived risks and facilitating smoother market entry. However, stakeholders also cautioned that an **FDA-only** posture can backfire—slowing iteration velocity, entrenching incumbent advantages through de facto regulatory capture, and imposing compliance costs that are prohibitive for early-stage or higher-risk ventures. While the FDA remains a respected gold standard, treating it as the default gate can signal optimization for bureaucratic processes rather than agile innovation. This can ultimately stagnate early-stage or high-risk ventures. Another model worth exploring is Próspera in Honduras, a Special Economic Zone that offers bespoke regulatory pathways for health and biotech. Próspera self-reports “15× faster commercialization of drugs,” “research timelines accelerated by 70%,” and “operating costs under 1% of other jurisdictions,” and markets its health regime as enabling companies to go “10–100× faster” than traditional venues[^50]. Under this framework, the gene-therapy startup Minicircle has conducted Phase I human trials in Próspera (e.g., a follistatin program), illustrating how the zone’s rules can be used to advance frontier therapies[^51]. That said, the model is contested—by bioethicists and biotech operators concerned about oversight[^52], by Honduran authorities challenging Próspera’s legality, and by local communities[^53]. Reporting has highlighted unapproved gene-therapy activity and permissive ethics structures; meanwhile, the zone is embroiled in legal disputes with the state amid efforts to unwind the SEZ framework[^54]. These tensions underscore both the potential speed advantages and the governance risks of using special-jurisdiction routes for biomedical development. Taken together, these models suggest three non-exclusive paths for LATAM: 1. **Global-first alignment.** Where relevant, align early with FDA/EMA-grade standards to de-risk future export and capital access. 2. **Parallel jurisdictions.** Explore SEZs or similar special-purpose regimes to compress permit cycles and enable supervised testing—under clear guardrails and transparency. 3. **Regional interoperability.** Advocate for mutual-recognition mechanisms between LATAM states for selected scientific approvals The objective is clear—reduce due-diligence friction for regional international capital and accelerate safe market entry for the region’s most promising Deep Tech ventures. --- ## 34th Regime: A Primer to Unite LATAM’s Disjointed Regulatory Frameworks Latin America’s Deep Tech policy landscape is a patchwork: several countries have strategies and tech-transfer programs, yet startups still face duplicative approvals, uneven incentives, and slow, case-by-case rulemaking across borders. Throughout our interviews, investors and founders stressed that one missing layer is coordination—portable rules and institutional capacity that let a company scale regionally under one predictable framework, enforced and adapted in concert across jurisdictions. Building on the prior chapter’s case for regional interoperability for scientific breakthroughs, this section outlines how mutual recognition, regional sandboxes, and a voluntary LATAM “single-startup status” could translate policy intent into cross-border scale, inspired by Europe’s emerging “28th Regime” model. Admittedly, a region-wide framework can sound politically unrealistic and structurally implausible given sovereignty concerns, market fragmentation, and institutional asymmetries. Yet a voluntary, modular design may reduce sovereignty costs, allows phased adoption, and creates incentives for convergence. Crucially, there is international precedent to devise LATAM’s “34th Regime”: a Pan-LATAM initiative to unite its 33 countries under a single regulatory framework for Deep Tech advancement. In December 2024 the grassroots coalition EU-Inc submitted more than 13,000 signatures urging the next European Commission to create a “28th Regime”: an optional, pan-European company form that would let a startup incorporated in one member state operate everywhere else through one fully digital registry, a harmonised dashboard and standard investment documents such as the proposed EU-FAST (Europe’s answer to U.S. SAFEs)[^55]. The idea has won backing from founders of Stripe, Wise and Bolt, heavyweight VCs like Index and Sequoia, and even Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who pledged to table a legislative proposal by 2025. France Digitale’s accompanying **non-paper** fleshes out the concept: a regulation (not a directive) would establish an **online-first, mobile-first, API-first corporate status** with minimal share-capital requirements, a single employee-stock-option regime, and due-diligence processes that can be completed 100% online. By stripping away the “27 different hurdles” that currently slow cross-border expansion, the 28th Regime is intended to give European scale-ups a clear path to become global champions and a label that inspires investor confidence across jurisdictions[^56]. Particularly for Deep Tech, this project proposes to adapt its subsidy rules to the realities of Deep Tech’s growth cycles. Under current EU state-aid regulations, any firm whose equity falls below 50% of capital is deemed an “undertaking in difficulty” and barred from receiving public subsidies. That threshold collides head-on with the business model of Deep Tech start-ups, which routinely run multi-year deficits while pouring cash into R&D long before revenue materialises. The 28th Regime blueprint therefore calls for an explicit exemption from state-aid restrictions for companies registered under the new, pan-European status—recognising that university spin-outs, biotech ventures and other science-heavy scale-ups may need five, ten or even fifteen years to break even. Adopting a comparable carve-out in Latin America would remove a critical brake on early public support for Deep Tech ventures, align incentives with long-horizon innovation, and further reinforce the region’s capacity to turn research excellence into globally competitive businesses. The key question is implementation, of course: * How could a LATAM model take shape in a region without an EU-style supranational authority or a shared legal backbone? * Through what vehicle would it be constituted: a multilateral treaty, a model law with opt-in adoption by national legislatures, or a plurilateral compact housed within CELAC or the Pacific Alliance? * Which institution would steward standards, updates, and dispute resolution? And what precedents in LATAM—mutual-recognition accords, model laws, or regulatory cooperation forums—can be adapted to Deep Tech? This could be a rich area for further research or follow-up policy design work. While a region-wide “single startup status” is still some way off, there is already a promising basic **recognition stack** taking shape. At the base, cross-border digital identity and electronic signatures are moving from pilots to practice—most visibly with Mercosur’s Digital Citizen, which lets people and investors use their national digital IDs to access services across borders[^57]. In trade, the new mutual recognition between Mercosur and Pacific Alliance “Authorized Economic Operator” programs, signed in 2025, streamline supply chains without creating a supranational authority[^58]. In health, the Pan American drug-regulatory network and the single-audit program for medical devices (accepted by multiple regulators, including Brazil’s) offer workable reliance models that could extend to Deep Tech verticals like AI hardware, advanced materials, and robotics. Taken together, this is **recognition without harmonization**—the scaffolding for a voluntary pilot of a regional Deep Tech startup label and shared sandboxes that prioritize portable credentials, portable evidence, and portable approvals while fully respecting national sovereignty. Down the line, the 34th Regime should also have the ability to propose policies that tackle the lack of policy incentives for Deep Tech ventures. Identified in the region, from specific policies and programs to create Deep Tech Companies and incentives to meet the demands of technological innovations (i.e., public purchases), to mechanisms to implement regulations tailored to these ventures, as identified by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in 2020[^59]. Looking ahead, we highlight some of the innovative regulatory strategies that several governments in the region are implementing to accelerate the development and scaling of Deep Tech innovations in LATAM. Rather than an exhaustive list, it aims at painting a diverse perspective of initiatives across the region that could serve as primers for the 34th Regime: #### Chile * **Directory of Deep-Tech Startups (2022; update 2024).** Education Ministry mapped 300 startups (44% biology, 43% digital) with high R&D intensity: strong post-grad talent, formal R&D units, in-house labs, patenting, and academic publishing[^60]. In 2024, a follow-on report further characterized Chile’s Deep Tech base[^61]. * **Technology Transfer Bill (2024).** Draft law to boost university-to-industry transfer via stronger IP rules and tighter academia–business links through hubs, shared labs, incubators, and accelerators.[^62]. #### Colombia * **Spin-off Law (2017).** Enables researchers at public universities to found companies from their science, clarifying dual-remuneration rules and easing commercialization. * **Patent Push (2021–2022).** Science Ministry programs doubled patent applications and narrowed the resident/non-resident gap, placing Colombia 3rd in LATAM for filings in 2022.[^63] #### Argentina * **CONICET Rules (2019).** Reforms allow researchers up to a two-year leave to create technology-based enterprises, reversing earlier restrictions on company formation. * **Entrepreneurship Law & FONDCE (2017).** Streamlined startup formation and launched a matching-funds program supporting accelerators/VCs—instrumental for backing ~79% of local Deep Tech startups[^64]. The objective is clear—reduce due-diligence friction for regional international capital and accelerate safe market entry for the region’s most promising Deep Tech ventures. --- ## How SEZs Convert the LATAM Discount into a Defensible Edge *By: Said Saillant* Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Latin America have proven they can attract global tech leaders. But traditional SEZs rely on tax incentives, a race to the bottom that competitors can match. The breakthrough lies in **Calibrated Regulatory Autonomy (CRA)**: giving SEZ authorities the power to adapt regulations in real-time while maintaining democratic oversight. UNCTAD defines SEZs as geographically delimited areas where governments offer a tailored regime—streamlined regulation, targeted fiscal incentives, and dedicated infrastructure—to de‑risk investment and attract foreign industries. They are not fringe experiments: UNCTAD counts 5,383 SEZs across 147 economies, with China alone hosting more than half.[^65] Its flagship zone, Shenzhen, transformed from a fishing village into a US$510 billion tech hub generating over 11 million jobs and contributing roughly 3% of China’s GDP.[^66] Latin America's top performers already demonstrate the potential. ### Proven Track Record * **Costa Rica** attracted Intel's $1.2B+ expansion, creating 3,400+ high-skill jobs and drawing Databricks to establish operations. The Free Trade Zone regime now contributes ~15% of GDP through 265,000 jobs, returning nearly $3 for every $1 in tax expenditure[^67]. * **Dominican Republic** operates 87 Free Zones hosting 25+ electronics leaders including Eaton and Rockwell Automation, generating $8.1B in exports and 197,600 direct jobs. Eaton recently added an R&D Design Center in Santo Domingo[^68]. * **Uruguay** leveraged its stable democracy to attract Satellogic's manufacturing operations and Newlab's innovation hub. Twelve Free Zones support 64,000 direct jobs and achieved near-record exports in 2024[^69]. These successes share a pattern: they moved beyond simple tax incentives to create **predictable, adaptive regulatory and administrative environments**. --- ### From Tax Perks to Time Advantage: Calibrated Autonomy Calibrated Regulatory Autonomy (CRA) means a statutory delegation that lets a zone steward modify, waive, or pilot regulatory requirements within strict guardrails. The law sets scope, non-retroactivity, transparency, service-level deadlines, appeals, and sunset or renewal. The steward issues time-boxed permissions, gathers evidence, and graduates proven conditions into standing rules mapped to external standards. The table contrasts typical LATAM SEZ practice with a CRA upgrade across governance, approvals, rule change, stability, compliance, transparency, standards alignment, talent, capital access, and disputes. **Table 1. SEZs in Practice, CRA in Contrast**[^70] | Dimension | Typical LATAM SEZ | CRA-SEZ (upgrade) | | :------------------ | :---------------------------------------------------------------------- | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **Governance** | National Free Zone law grants fixed tax/customs incentives; many ministries handle permits; no single front door | One steward runs intake, triage, and a single appeals path under statute | | **Approvals** | Paper shuttling; ad hoc committees; timelines swing with elections | Clocked service targets per step; inquiry→pilot ≤30 days for low/medium risk | | **Rule change** | Decrees or laws update rules infrequently; firms wait quarters/years | Time-boxed, conditional permissions; scheduled “graduation” into SOPs | | **Stability** | Clauses cover taxes/customs only; little on data, AI, pilots | Non-retroactivity, stability agreements, published memos cover novel uses | | **Compliance** | General regulators apply one-size rules; no risk tiers; no pilots | Tiered evidence (test plans, monitoring, power limits); renewals depend on outcomes | | **Transparency** | Sparse metrics; few written precedents; broker folklore guides applicants | Live dashboards, decision memos, searchable precedent library | | **Standards mapping** | Patchy FDA/EMA/ISO alignment; exporters redo tests abroad | In-zone conformity assessment mapped to US/EU/ISO for portability | | **Talent** | Institutes sit outside; curricula lag vacancies; weak apprenticeships | Institutes co-locate; curriculum co-design; SLAs for apprenticeships; payroll-levy co-funding | | **Capital access** | Slow procurement; episodic CVC; nonstandard datarooms/onboarding | Standard datarooms, vendor whitelists, recurring roadshows; faster vendor onboarding | | **Disputes** | Local courts/generic arbitration; long resolution times | Model contracts, named venues; target ≤90-day resolution | Baseline SEZs trade taxes for factories. CRA trades predictable speed and precedent for durable Deep Tech investment, which removes the priced-in LATAM discount. --- ### The Democratic Regulatory Sweet Spot This table benchmarks jurisdictional models against their core limits and business impacts, then shows how a LATAM SEZ with CRA counters each risk. Use it as a site-selection and policy-design guide: identify where democratic, contract-backed, fast-adapting rules deliver a competitive edge. | Jurisdiction | Core Limitation | Business Impact | LATAM SEZ + CRA Advantage | | :----------- | :------------------------- | :--------------------------- | :-------------------------------------- | | **Gulf States** | Policy by executive decree | Sovereign/data appropriation risk | Constitutional protections + rapid adaptation | | **US/EU/UK** | Multi-layered compliance | Slow, expensive approvals | Streamlined processes + global portability | | **China** | Technology transfer mandates | Closed innovation ecosystem | Open integration with global partners | | **Hong Kong** | Geopolitical constraints | Shrinking policy autonomy | Fresh mandates + design flexibility | **The unique combination**: Democratic governance + contractual stability + regulatory agility. A LATAM SEZ with CRA pairs democratic legitimacy, contractual stability, and rapid adaptation, so it outperforms Gulf, US/EU/UK, China, and HK on innovation velocity at lower risk. Match your constraint to the left column, read the CRA response, extract the instrument. Use the table to justify a regional advantage, not just a zone choice. --- ### Talent Infrastructure That Scales Place training institutes inside the SEZ to lock strategic partnerships with anchor firms and the zone steward. That placement enables curriculum co-design for live vacancies, shared labs with duty-free gear, guaranteed apprenticeships, payroll-levy co-funding, fast instructor visas, skills-forecast data-sharing, standard IP/spinout terms, and direct placement pipelines into tenants. Outside the zone, institutes face fragmented gatekeepers, customs delays, weak feedback loops, and slower hiring: * **INFOTEP — Dominican Republic.** A 1% payroll levy finances custom tech courses co-designed with Free Zone tenants and delivered on-site; programs retool quickly for new lines.[^71] * **INA — Costa Rica.** Free, skills-based training in high-demand sectors; dual vocational tracks modeled on Germany’s system expand firm-aligned talent[^72]. * **INEFOP — Uruguay.** With Uruguay XXI, “Finishing Schools” co-finance up to 70% of bespoke company training plans to ramp workforces for new investments.[^73] Inside an SEZ, these models plug into anchor-firm MOUs with performance clauses and shared facilities, which shortens vacancy-to-hire cycles and lifts placement rates. --- ### Geopolitical Positioning–SEZ-first, ADD/CHIPS as levers SEZs anchor nearshoring. They deliver predictable rules, fast permits, and bonded logistics. The Alliance for Development in Democracy (ADD) and the CHIPS Act’s International Technology Security and Innovation (ITSI) Fund play supporting roles that amplify the zone’s pull.[^74] * **Role of ADD.** Provides a diplomatic umbrella for joint statements, supply-chain cooperation, and a private-sector channel. Use it to convene buyers, secure priority customs lanes, and publish joint procurement calls that route demand into the SEZ. * **Role of CHIPS/ITSI.** Provides grants and technical assistance for trusted semiconductor supply chains. Use it to co-finance Assembly-Testing-Packaging (ATP) lines, metrology labs, and workforce programs inside the SEZ, and to validate compliance against US/EU standards. * **Design moves for the SEZ.** 1. Write the CRA statute to meet ITSI eligibility and US/EU conformity mapping. 2. Create an ADD deal room inside the zone for anchor tenants and financiers. 3. Pre-permit ATP and secure data facilities to shorten time-to-operate. 4. Tie institute training MOUs to CHIPS-aligned curricula and tooling. The SEZ does the work. ADD and CHIPS reduce coordination and capital costs so the zone scales faster. --- ### Building the Innovation Ecosystem Having set the legal-ops engine (CRA) and the geopolitical levers (ADD/CHIPS), the SEZ now needs a demand-and-talent flywheel. The zone provides the physical hub that executes the report’s ecosystem moves: * **Investor Education**. Short, sector-specific teach-ins for LPs, CVCs, and family offices; standard datarooms; quarterly roadshows tied to live pilots. * **Science-Business Matchmaking**. Mapped researcher inventories, founder/operator pools, and templated IP/consulting terms; standing “clinic days” with anchor firms. * **Annual Flagship Summit**. Demo proven pilots, publish precedent updates, and run deal rooms with ADD/CHIPS partners and export-credit agencies. These ecosystem moves create repeat deal flow and faster learning inside the zone. With pilots, partners, and training running on clocks, CRA converts each approval into precedent and each into lower friction for the next. That flywheel sets up the compounding advantage that follows. ### The Compounding Advantage Traditional SEZs handle place and logistics. CRA attacks time. In deep tech, time gains snowball: early regulatory clarity shortens build cycles, pulls stronger talent, and converts each pilot into reusable playbooks. The result: Latin America transforms from a discount destination into a premium platform for global innovation, one that competitors cannot easily copy because the advantage lies not in any single policy, but in the compounding returns of adaptive, democratic governance. SEZs lay the platform. CRA supplies pace and credibility. Together they turn chronic disadvantages into a durable moat. --- ## Public Investment Public funding plays an essential role in the development of Deep Tech ecosystems, particularly during the early stages of research and development. Over the past decade, countries such as Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia have introduced a variety of public programs to foster technology-based entrepreneurship. These initiatives range from government programs aimed at increasing the number of patents to those offering millions of dollars in matching funds each year. Such support mechanisms—public grant and incentive programs alongside angel investors—have proven vital in bridging the financing gap for Deep Tech startups, allowing them to advance from early R&D phases to market entry without heavy equity dilution. In fact, public funding programs accounted for 70% of all Deep Tech financing in Brazil, as noted by EMERGE in 2024[^75]. Governments have increasingly recognized that Deep Tech startups are not just about fostering innovation—they are also a vital component of national competitiveness. Namely, Costa Rica’s semiconductor roadmap to attract FDI (2024)[^76] and Chile’s roadmap to advance its quantum technology sector with applications in mining, renewable energy, and cybersecurity[^77], to name a few. However, this heavy reliance on public programs—which, in Brazil’s case, accounted for 70% of Deep Tech financing in 2024—signals an imbalance that could hinder long-term ecosystem maturity. In benchmark markets like the United States, the European Union and the OECD, businesses supply over 60% of R&D funding (and in China nearly 80%) while government shares hover around just 20–30%. In LATAM, by contrast, the state underwrites roughly 60% of R&D, far above its international peers, whereas in Latin America private investors contribute only about 35% and governments cover the remaining 60%[^78]. Public financing for Deep Tech typically manifests in two main forms. First, **non-dilutive grants**, which help preserve equity for founders and early investors while enhancing capital efficiency, allowing startups to advance without the burden of significant dilution. This type of funding is especially important because Deep Tech projects often require prolonged periods of research before a viable product can be developed. In addition to grants, **matching funds** programs have emerged as another successful public financing model. Inspired by the Israeli model, governments in Argentina and Uruguay have implemented matching funds initiatives that co-invest with private venture capital and angel investors. These programs reduce the risk for private investors and also ensure that Deep Tech startups have access to the necessary capital to scale up. By matching private investment, these initiatives create a multiplier effect that accelerates innovation and supports the growth of Deep Tech ecosystems. Yet, an intriguing question emerged: **is the challenge one of increasing the amount of funding, or is it about improving the quality and efficiency of the available resources?** The public sector’s core role should be to complement and de-risk private Deep Tech investment through targeted innovation programs—such as matching-fund schemes, special economic zones, shared labs and applied R&D grants—while simultaneously advancing the regulatory and institutional framework via robust technology-transfer laws, empowered local economic-development corporations, STEM education initiatives and streamlined permitting processes. Although Latin America already hosts promising examples in Chile, Argentina, Brazil and beyond, these instruments remain too fragmented and limited in scale. Scaling them up and weaving them into a coherent, region-wide playbook will be essential to convert today’s promising pilots into a truly mature Deep Tech ecosystem. ### The case of Biotech in Brazil: Broad but Shallow Public Funding for Deep Tech The biotech sector in Brazil is particularly noteworthy, standing out as one of the most mature Deep Tech ecosystems in the region. Remarkably, this sector represents almost 60% of biotech startups across Latin America. Various public funding programs, such as PIPE FAPESP and FINEP have been instrumental in this growth[^79]. However, despite these significant investments, participants of this research pointed out that the grants provided through public programs still tend to be "low-ticket funding", as these amounts are insufficient to fully meet the substantial R&D and laboratory setup needs essential for scaling Deep Tech innovations in biotechnology. The report’s authors clearly recommend strengthening and continuing established public programs such as MCTI, Centelha (FINEP), Catalisa (SEBRAE), PIPE (FAPESP), and EMBRAPII to support Deep Tech innovation. Similarly, Brazilian investors interviewed for this report suggested that rather than increasing the number of public funding rounds, the focus should be on increasing the funding amounts per round. This approach would enable startups to secure the larger capital injections needed to fully support their R&D and scaling efforts, ultimately boosting the sector’s growth and competitiveness. Although replicating this analysis in other countries across the continent is challenging due to the overall lack of maturity in their Deep Tech ecosystems outside of Brazil, it can serve as a valuable roadmap for developing nations. Adopting strategies that not only strengthen existing public programs but also increase the funding amounts per round could be key to driving growth and enhancing technological competitiveness in regions still in their early developmental stages. #### Institutions & Programs for R&D in Brazil * **FAPESP:** A leading state-level funding agency in Brazil, FAPESP plays a central role in supporting both fundamental research and innovation, particularly through academia-company collaborations. * [**PIPE Program**](https://fapesp.br/58/programa-fapesp-pesquisa-inovativa-em-pequenas-empresas-pipe): Inspired by the U.S. SBIR model, this program funds innovative R&D in small companies based in São Paulo. It offers phased support (feasibility, development, and scale-up) and explicitly supports technology-based entrepreneurship. * [**Cooperative Research for Innovation**](https://fapesp.br/cpe/): This initiative fosters structured partnerships between universities and companies. They have established programs on AI, advanced mobility and biotech, amongst others, with corporations like Shell, IBM and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), to name a few. * [**International Research Centers**](https://agencia.fapesp.br/fapesp-busca-atrair-instituicoes-cientificas-de-renome-mundial-para-sao-paulo/54136): In March 2025, FAPESP launched a $5 million reais initiative to boost São Paulo's Deep Tech global competitiveness by developing scientific research institutions, focusing initially on a biology center for immune and inflammatory responses. * **FINEP (Brazilian Innovation Agency):** Linked to the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MCTI), FINEP is Brazil’s main federal-level public financier of business R&D and innovation. * [**Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico**](http://www.finep.gov.br/a-finep-externo/fndct/historico-e-legislacao): Launched in 1969, and reestablished in 2016, it promotes legislation for Deep Tech and non-refundable grants. * [**Mais Inovação Program**](https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/noticias/2024/01/mcti-e-finep-detalham-chamadas-publicas-para-projetos-do-mais-inovacao): Launched in 2024, this is a flagship federal program offering non-reimbursable grants and credit for R&D-intensive companies in areas such as health, energy, ICTs, and sustainability. * [**Private R&D Center Attraction Incentives**](http://www.finep.gov.br/noticias/todas-noticias/6919-com-r-3-bi-finep-e-bndes-lancam-edital-para-atrair-centros-de-pd-i-ao-brasil): In partnership with Brazil Development’s Bank (BNDES) FINEP is offering 500 million dollars in funding to incentivize multinational and national firms to set up R&D hubs in Brazil, reinforcing local innovation ecosystems. ### Matching Funds in Argentina, Chile & Uruguay Matching‐fund schemes address the well-known market failure of private underinvestment in innovation by co-investing public capital alongside private sector resources. Under these programs, a government body provides reimbursable grants or low-interest loans to R&D projects, accelerators, or VC funds—typically covering 40–60% of eligible costs—on the condition that private partners supply the remainder. This structure aligns incentives, enforces rigorous project validation (since private capital is at stake), and creates a self-sustaining cycle: successful projects repay the public coffers, while failures equally burden both sides, minimizing bureaucracy and maximizing agility. Israel’s resurgence from the economic crisis in the mid-1980s owes much to three flagship matching funds. The 1985 R&D Law reimbursed up to 50% of corporate R&D, catalyzing over 1,000 projects annually and lifting private R&D spending to 4% of GDP. The 1991 Incubator Program leveraged US$600 million to underwrite 24 private incubators, fueling 1,700 startups with a 40% survival rate and US$3.5 billion in follow-on investment. Finally, the 1993 Yozma Program injected US$100 million into ten VC funds (40% public, 60% private), sparking a domestic venture industry that now manages over US$10 billion and has generated more than US$80 billion in value creation[^80]. It’s important to note that Israel’s matching-fund playbook is an extension of its security doctrine: the state has long viewed scientific R&D as a strategic buffer against regional threats, integrating the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) with the civilian tech sector to maintain a qualitative edge. In fact, mandatory service in elite IDF tech units—especially 8200 and 81—funnels thousands of engineers who have already tackled real-world defense challenges into the civilian economy; Unit 8200 alumni alone have launched 1,000-plus start-ups, many in cybersecurity and other dual-use Deep Tech fields[^81]. This perpetual talent flywheel has created what analysts describe as a singular “military-technology complex”—one in which prototypes are stress-tested by the IDF and then spun out into global markets at speed. In that context, the state’s flagship matching-fund schemes (R&D Law, Incubator Program, Yozma) function not only as market-failure correctors but as deliberate extensions of a security-driven industrial policy: public capital de-risks the earliest stages, private investors pile in once battlefield-validated, and the proceeds feed back into both defence and commercial innovation[^82]. In the Latin American context, a comparable large-scale public–private mobilization would require different rationales aligned with domestic strengths and priorities, like natural-resource-based innovation, climate adaptation, biodiversity protection, public health, biosecurity or logistics and trade facilitation. Inspired by Israel, Argentina’s 2017 Entrepreneurs Law established FONDCE (“Fund of Funds”) to underwrite both science-based accelerators and early-stage VCs with reimbursable, interest-bearing loans and partial operating grants. It also simplified company formation—allowing startups to incorporate in under 24 hours—and reduced red tape. Within two years, five Deep Tech accelerators backed by FONDCE had invested in 79% of Argentina’s investor-funded Deep Tech ventures, demonstrating outsized startup creation relative to regional peers. Chile’s Economic Development Agency (CORFO) has deployed matching-fund programs since the early 1990s to correct private underinvestment in innovation[^83]. Through its flagship FONTEC (now under the Innova umbrella), CORFO provides reimbursable grants covering 40–65% of private R&D costs, backing thousands of business-innovation projects and fostering university–industry collaboration. Complementing this, the FONDEF fund co-finances pre-competitive joint R&D between academia and firms, further strengthening Chile’s Deep Tech research base. Alumni include ventures like **NotCo**—which leverages AI for plant-based food innovation, one of the biggest Deep Tech —and **Autofact**, a data-driven automotive analytics platform, illustrating the program’s reach and impact. In 2022 Uruguay enacted Law 20.075—formally approved in 2023—to kick-start Deep Tech ventures by prioritizing advanced digital platforms, biotechnology, and green-tech innovations. Building on this mandate, in May 2024 the government inaugurated the Uruguay Innovation Hub (UIH) as a public–private collaboration nexus, with laboratory space, pilot programs, mentorship tracks, and grant-based resources designed to help early-stage startups scale cutting-edge technologies. Concurrent with the UIH launch, the government allocated US $10 million for a 1:1 matching-funds program under UIH’s management[^84]. Under this scheme, vetted venture-capital firms and angel investors co-invest alongside UIH via convertible notes, with disbursements tied to clear technical and commercial milestones. Early participants—including biotech pioneer **Horizonte Biotech**, AI analytics startup **EcoSense Technologies**, and cleantech innovator **GreenWave Analytics**—have already leveraged these co-investments to accelerate R&D, validate prototypes, and expand into regional markets[^85]. ### Pensions: A Fund-of-Funds for Domestic Deep Tech Pension funds should be part of the conversation on Deep Tech financing in Latin America. They are among the region’s largest pools of patient capital, yet much of that capital is deployed abroad rather than into domestic innovation. Unfortunately, beyond isolated remarks in private interviews for this report, we found no coordinated effort to bring pension trustees, supervisors, and Deep Tech managers around a shared investment architecture. Global benchmarks clarify both the feasibility and the urgency. Across Europe and the United States, pension funds account for **under 5%** of the top-50 Deep Tech investors by deal count by 2024—well behind VC funds, government entities, and corporate VCs**[^86]**. Even so, their presence—however small—demonstrates an investable foothold and a clear policy lever. For the authors of the 2024 State of European Tech Report, the strategy is clear: **redirecting even a small share of pension assets currently invested outside the EU** could unlock the patient capital needed to seed and scale Deep Tech. While this step-change is challenging, it would narrow the funding gap, strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, and create a more reliable, end-to-end capital pipeline across stages[^87]. The 2025 **“CERN for AI”** white paper, authored by the European Union, which lays out a roadmap for a pan-European organization to accelerate the AI ecosystem, also points to European pension to unlock key, patient capital to seed and scale the initiative[^88]. And In the United Kingdom, the idea is also entering the mainstream media[^89]. Most importantly, the UK’s **Mansion House** policy reforms are already putting this approach into practice—and France’s **Tibi** initiative goes even further by setting clear commitments for institutional investors, including pension funds, to channel capital into French tech. Under Tibi’s first phase (2020–2022), institutional investors committed **€6.4 billion** to approved funds. In its second phase, the French financial marketplace projects **€40–50 billion** in technology funds under management by **2026**, with the potential to support **~15 late-stage funds** each managing **over €1 billion[^90]**. While precise figures are hard to aggregate across LATAM, a useful order-of-magnitude comes from the OECD: **in Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, pension AUM total roughly US$1 trillion. Redirecting even 1% of that would mobilize USD 10 billion for domestic Deep Tech[^91].** Even a smaller slice would be catalytic for the region’s Series A–C financing gap. **This 1% would represent about four times the USD2.5 billion deployed into LATAM Deep Tech since 2018**–enough to turn today’s funding bottleneck into an investable pipeline and signal that the region is ready to scale on its own terms. #### Recommendation: A Fund-of-Funds Path for Patient Capital A coalition-led strategy can change the frame: instead of treating pensions as distant spectators, invite them—prudently and voluntarily—into vehicles that channel a small share of assets toward local R&D and Deep Tech, without compromising fiduciary duty. As demonstrated by Europe, even a modest reallocation would be catalytic. To turn this flag into a program, targeted advocacy and policy-design work are needed. Immediate priorities are to specify investable vehicles that fit fiduciary mandates, map the regulatory tweaks that would enable pilot allocations, and define safeguards that protect senior pension tranches. Governments should take the lead in mobilizing long-horizon capital for Deep Tech. A practical approach is establishing a public-anchored Fund-of-Funds (FoF). By pooling public-sector balance sheets, including mutual insurance and pension funds, into such an FoF, governments can set an example. This FoF would then commit to independent managers through clear, competitive mandates, drawing inspiration from the 2018 Tibi report where this policy was initially outlined in France[^92]. The UK’s Mansion House Accord (May 2025) has already taken this french policy as first step. Proposed in May 2025, they have pledged to allocate 10% of pension provided portfolios to private markets by 2030, with at least 5% ring-fenced for UK assets—framed as voluntary, fiduciary-aligned, and monitored. Complementing this, the BVCA’s 2025 expert panel proposes a UK “NOVA” program, modeled on Tibi, to accredit eligible venture/growth funds and stand up an FoF—steps LATAM can mirror with development banks and multilaterals[^93]. Adaptation to the LATAM context is essential—whether executed nationally or via a regional platform. And while this is a long-term play, the near-term gap is clear: institutional investors often lack Deep Tech expertise. The immediate recommendation is to start there—educate privately and convene publicly—so that signal and structure reinforce each other. ### Shared R&D Infrastructure From quantum rigs and petabyte-scale AI clusters to secure blockchain nodes and biotech wet-labs, Latin American innovators converge on one persistent bottleneck: the region’s limited supply of specialised, capital-intensive R&D infrastructure. Governments have begun to chip away at the gap and the results are visible. Brazil now boasts **11 active biotech hubs[^94]**, Chile at least **three**, Uruguay at least **seven[^95]**, and Argentina at least **one**. Yet the region is still scratching the surface of what is needed; a concerted push to expand shared facilities and pilot plants could unlock far more research spin-outs and shorten the time from lab bench to market-ready product. #### Recommendation Build on the early successes of national programs by doubling down on open-access labs and pilot plants—expanding their capacity, replicating proven models in new countries, and coordinating investments region-wide—so that every Deep Tech venture in Latin America can tap world-class facilities without prohibitive upfront costs. * **Parque de Innovación de Buenos Aires (Argentina)**: Urban innovation district under development that spans 12 city blocks and 340,000 m², uniting universities, research centers, co-working spaces, and startups in a vibrant ecosystem designed to boost research, entrepreneurship, and collaboration. * [**Startuplab.01**](https://fch.cl/iniciativa/startuplab01/) **(Chile)**: CORFO and Fundación Chile launched Staruplab.01, a shared lab and cowork space for Deep Tech startups focused on climate tech, specifically. It is supported by the International Development Bank, and has partnered up with key players in the region, like GridX, for its programs[^96]. * [**Patagonia Biotech Hub**](https://www.eha.cl/noticia/local/en-puerto-varas-se-inauguro-patagonia-biotech-hub-el-primer-centro-de-innovacion-biotecnologica) **(Chile)**: In September 2024, another shared lab and cowork space was launched, specifically for biotech startups. It was backed by the Ministry of Science, in collaboration with local authorities and academia[^97]. * [**CBT SOFOFA HUB**](https://cbt.sofofahub.cl/) **(Chile):** The Translational Biotechnology Center (CBT) is a Chilean initiative aimed at accelerating the adoption and scaling of biotechnology solutions across various industries, including biomedicine, mining, aquaculture, forestry, and agriculture. It offers networking opportunities, and academic and entrepreneurial training, in partnership with top academic, public and private institutions in Chile. * **New Lab (Uruguay)**: Newlab’s first LATAM hub—a partnership with Uruguay’s innovation agency (ANII), Globant, UPM and other corporates—offers state-of-the-art prototyping labs, pilot testbeds and venture programs inside Montevideo’s new Innovation Campus, serving climate-tech, advanced materials, bio- and digital-tech startups and connecting them with capital, industry partners and international markets[^98]. --- ## Social Clusters Beyond capital availability, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks, Latin America's Deep Tech transformation depends on systematically building social clusters, dense networks connecting researchers, entrepreneurs, investors, and institutions that enable knowledge transfer and risk mitigation at commercial scales. These networks form the invisible "relationship architecture" that converts research breakthroughs into scalable ventures, without them, even breakthrough innovations can remain trapped in laboratories. ### The Network Infrastructure Gap Scientific talent abundance means little without connection infrastructure. A study of Chilean biotech firms revealed that almost half of the business links (47%) originated from personal connections and that professional and academic environments are highly important for creating these links[^99]. Similarly, analysis of global tech hubs shows that serial entrepreneurs and investors serve as crucial "ecosystem connectors," with individual network brokers linked to up to 15 different ventures simultaneously. Silicon Valley's success stems partly from its 60+ annual tech conferences creating "temporary townships" of concentrated interaction, while Cambridge UK's cluster generates £18 billion annually through systematic face-to-face networking events[^100][^101]. Israel's innovation ecosystem produces one startup for every 1,400 citizens largely because military alumni networks create pre-established trust relationships that accelerate deal flow and knowledge sharing[^102]. Berlin adds yet another model: its rise as Europe’s fastest-growing startup hub was driven less by capital abundance than by grassroots density. With 40,000 business registrations annually and nearly half of its founders from abroad, Berlin leveraged affordability, cultural openness, and hundreds of informal meetups to build critical mass. Only after this community infrastructure matured did capital follow by 2021 Berlin startups raised over €10 billion in funding, surpassing London[^103]. Latin America has systematically underinvested in this relationship infrastructure. Past programs provided capital and services but failed to establish enduring networks, causing knowledge leakage and preventing ecosystem self-reinforcement. Strategic interventions in Chile and Colombia demonstrate how targeted network-building transforms isolated talent into synergistic innovation clusters. ### Contrasting Network Formation Models #### Chile's External Integration Strategy Start-Up Chile (SUC), the country’s flagship accelerator program launched in 2010, is widely recognised as Latin America’s most successful public innovation initiative. It pioneered an "import and mingle" model, offering equity-free $40K grants plus one-year visas to foreign entrepreneurs who relocated to Santiago. Crucially, it enforced mixed cohorts, a socio‑psychological mechanism that encouraged interaction between Chilean and foreign teams[^104]. By design, this model was meant to transfer global startup know-how–how to search for customers, test hypotheses, negotiate with investors—while instantly widening Chilean founders’ networks. A 2014 study found the $40K grant was useful but non-differentiating for foreign and domestic founders. The real divergence was peer learning: only 16% of foreign founders named it their primary source of value versus 45% of domestic founders. In plain terms, local founders extracted more actionable knowledge from cohort interactions. The mechanism can be intuitive, the authors of the report state. Lower-confidence entrepreneurs are more likely to observe, imitate, and internalize the concrete behaviors modeled by credible peers (role-model effects), especially when those behaviors are repeatedly reinforced in shared workspaces and milestones. It’s important to frame this psychology carefully. This is not “copying foreigners” because Chileans lack confidence; it is structured exposure to role models who operationalize global norms and tactics that are harder to learn from manuals—timeboxing experiments, instrumenting funnels, converting warm intros, or navigating term sheets. SUC’s bet was that imported know-how could become shared know-how if you engineered the right social collisions—and the data suggest it worked. Results exceeded expectations: 3,000+ startups from 85 countries entered SUC, and collectively generated over $1 billion in collective sales and raised $1.2 billion in follow-on funding[^105]. The influx of talent put “Chilecon Valley” on the global innovation map, while 68% of Chilean founders reported changing their financing strategies after engaging with international peers. #### Alianza DeepTech Colombia Colombia pursued systematic domestic network strengthening through the Alianza DeepTech Colombia, designed as a private Ecosystem-as-a-Service (EaaS) model. The Alianza DeepTech Colombia has united 31 stakeholders, universities, corporations, government agencies, under coordinated action commitments: joint research projects, cross-institutional mentorship, sector-specific working groups, and unified policy advocacy. So far, it has mapped and strengthened the existing social web among science-based entrepreneurs[^106]. Among a wider mix of public and private efforts, early signals are encouraging for this ecosystem-as-a-service (EaaS) player. The 2024 DeepTech Colombia report—without attributing causality to any single program—documents 56% year-over-year growth in Deep Tech startups (now 56 active companies), 500+ new jobs, $60 million in fresh investment, and $800+ million in total ecosystem value. It also notes near gender parity (49% female founders) and a geographic concentration in Bogotá (47%) and Medellín (33%), where research institutions and face-to-face networks are densest[^107]. Colombia’s alliance shows that intentional domestic network-building can rapidly scale a deep‑tech community. These deep‑tech firms now have visible success stories and the rising jobs base is attracting more engineers and scientists[^108]. Rather than relying on one program or funding round, Colombia’s multi‑stakeholder structure has aligned universities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and government agencies in a single value chain. In short, the alliance model is creating a self-reinforcing loop of collaboration on Colombian terms, not just importing outsiders. ### Value Generation Through Networks Across both models, and in global analogues, the advantages of social clustering are clear and measurable. Dense networks accelerate knowledge spillovers. Ideas and technical insights flow far faster through personal ties than through journals or conferences alone[^109]. More specifically, dense networks create measurable economic advantages through four primary mechanisms: * **Accelerated Knowledge Spillovers**: Technical insights flow faster through personal relationships than formal publications. For instance, face-to-face interactions transfer tacit knowledge, equipment operation tricks, failure pattern recognition, market timing intuition, that never appears in academic papers but determines startup success[^110]. * **Risk Mitigation**: Trusted network referrals reduce investor due diligence costs while improving deal quality[^111]. When an investor learns about a startup through a trusted contact or local mentor network, they gain informal information that supplements formal due diligence. * **Resource Bundling Efficiency**: A startup needing specialized equipment, legal advice, and a pilot customer can often find all three through cluster connections. In engineering hubs (e.g. aerospace or AI), this means assembling domain experts, grant money, and manufacturing partners much faster than if each entrepreneur had to start cold. Empirical studies of incubators confirm that *network-based support* tends to improve venture performance by granting access to learning and social capital[^112]. In practice, Colombia’s DeepTech alliance reports exactly this: targeted channels for funding (venture capital roadshows), talent (university placements), and markets (industry partnerships) have made each cent of public support more productive. * **Self-Enforcing Ecosystem Loops:** Each entrepreneurial success, whether through startups, exits, or spin-offs, feeds back into the ecosystem, strengthening its foundations. These achievements generate new social capital, attract investment, and nurture talent. Over time, as experienced founders mentor others or reinvest in new ventures, a culture of “giving back” takes root[^113]. This dynamic resembles an Ecosystem Nutrition Cycle, where resources and experiences circulate, compounding benefits and steadily raising the ecosystem’s maturity and resilience. ### Lessons for Latin America’s Deep Tech Ecosystems Latin America’s Deep Tech trajectory demonstrates that capital and regulation, while necessary, are insufficient without the social architecture that allows ecosystems to compound. Experiences from Chile, Colombia, and global innovation hubs underscore a common theme: ecosystems thrive where networks are deliberately built, continuously reinforced, and institutionally anchored. The following lessons highlight the structural elements Latin America must prioritize, continuity, domestic alliances, and density, followed by an implementation framework tailored to regional realities. **Continuity and Follow-Through** Isolated interventions create sparks but rarely sustain momentum. Programs that bring in foreign talent or inject capital can generate visibility, yet without follow-through they risk becoming transient episodes. Chile’s Start-Up Chile illustrates this: while it successfully imported global know-how, the absence of retention and institutional anchoring meant that most of the value dissipated once participants left. Ecosystem growth requires continuity—follow-up mechanisms that extend beyond the program cycle to embed knowledge and relationships into the local innovation fabric. **Domestic Alliances** Durable ecosystems emerge when local actors coalesce around shared goals. Colombia’s Alianza DeepTech demonstrates the power of structured collaboration: universities, firms, and government agencies aligning under joint commitments and measurable KPIs transformed a fragmented landscape into a nationally visible cluster. The lesson is that ecosystems cannot rely on episodic initiatives or external actors alone. Domestic alliances institutionalize trust, concentrate resources, and create the connective tissue that enables Deep Tech ventures to scale. **The Density Dividend** Global examples confirm that density (the frequency and intensity of interactions) drives innovation outcomes as decisively as funding. Silicon Valley’s constant churn of conferences, Cambridge’s deliberate face-to-face networking, and Israel’s trust-based alumni networks show how repeated interaction lowers transaction costs, accelerates tacit knowledge transfer, and amplifies deal flow. For Latin America, the insight is clear: capital must be complemented by recurring spaces of interaction that allow ideas, talent, and capital to circulate with speed and trust. **Implementation for Latin America** These lessons converge on a hybrid framework. First, prioritize continuity by embedding retention incentives, tracking mechanisms, and institutional anchors that prevent knowledge leakage. Second, formalize domestic alliances that unite universities, corporations, investors, and government agencies under coordinated structures with shared objectives. Third, cultivate density through recurring interaction platforms –monthly meetups, flagship summits, and sector-specific convenings—that replicate the “density dividend” of global hubs. By embedding continuity, alliances, and density into policy design, Latin America can transform isolated scientific talent into enduring, self-reinforcing Deep Tech ecosystems. --- ## Corporate Venture Capital Corporate venture capital (CVC) has emerged as a linchpin for accelerating private-sector R&D, helping nations close the gap between fledgling ideas and market-ready technologies. Corporate venture capital refers specifically to corporate-backed VC arms—venture capital funds directly operated by established corporations using their own balance-sheet capital. This differs fundamentally from traditional venture capital, which manages external limited partners' (LPs) funds with a primary focus on financial returns. While both models carry the "venture capital" designation, they operate with distinct logics and objectives. Traditional VCs are primarily accountable to their limited partners (LPs) for financial performance, while CVCs pursue dual objectives: financial returns alongside strategic benefits such as access to emerging technologies, new markets, talent acquisition, and organizational learning. This makes CVC units the corporation's "eyes and ears" in the external innovation ecosystem, providing strategic intelligence that purely financial investors cannot match[^114]. CVC sits within a wider corporate-venturing toolbox that includes incubators, accelerators, venture clienting, strategic partnerships, tech scouting and challenge prizes. The most effective programs pair investment with privileged assets—distribution, data, domain experts, regulatory know-how, and facilities for pilots. CVC typically takes three main shapes: * **Equity investments** via dedicated corporate funds * **R&D partnerships**, where startups receive financing in exchange for co-developing new products * **Licensing agreements** that provide non-dilutive revenue streams while preserving startups’ core IP ### Global Benchmark Globally, the trend is unmistakable. High-net-worth individuals—among them Bill Gates—are channeling sizable capital into frontier startups, while SPAC listings have opened NASDAQ to new science-driven ventures. Major incumbents such as Pfizer, Ford, Tyson Foods, Lockheed Martin Ventures and GM are not only acquiring Deep Tech startups but also spinning up their own venture arms to scout disruptive innovation[^115]. In fact, momentum has been building for years: globally, from 2017 to 2021, overall corporate venturing expanded **2.8×**, corporate–Deep Tech collaborations surged **4.2×,** and the weight of Deep Tech startups in corporate venturing portfolios was expected to grow in the next five years in 71% of cases—a clear alignment between incumbents and frontier science[^116]. Still, momentum is uneven across regions. By 2021, about **90%** of U.S. corporates operated venture arms; **57%** of firms in East and Southeast Asia had launched CVC programs; and in Latin America, only **~40%** of companies were engaged in CVC—underscoring both the gap and the upside for the region[^117]. In Sweden, roughly 70 percent of local startups have secured investment from local corporate venture arms. That influence grows as companies mature—CVCs participate in about 30 percent of Series A rounds and 60 percent of Series B rounds—because the startups’ platform technologies often dovetail with the strategic objectives of their corporate backers[^118]. European evidence points the same way: Hello Tomorrow finds **lower bankruptcy rates for CVC-backed startups (~1.24%) vs. those without (~2.58%)**, suggesting corporate investors contribute more than capital—**distribution, technical validation, and procurement pathways** that improve survival odds[^119]. Taken together, these benchmarks underscore an enormous upside for LATAM. The region sits on a wide, still-underexploited runway. ### LATAM’s CVC Reality Check Latin America reveals both immense potential and limitations in CVC deployment. The region combines the weight of major local multinationals such as Cemex, Marcopolo, Grupo Bimbo, and JBS with the presence of global incumbents including Siemens, IBM, Nestlé, Pfizer, and Novartis, all of which maintain significant R&D and business operations. Together, these actors could provide a powerful foundation for scaling Deep Tech: local firms contribute market knowledge and insight into regional challenges, while international players bring advanced technologies, structured innovation programs, and global networks. Zooming out first: the broader CVC market across all sectors **reached $3B in 2024**, up from **$1.5B in 2023**[^120]. Against that backdrop, Deep Tech remains **too small to appear as a stand‑alone category** in most regional tallies—evidence of how early the corporate adoption curve still is in the specific niche. Dealroom does provide statistics specific for Deep Tech in the region **funding rose from $9M in 2020 to $119M in 2022**, then **retracted to $73.9M in 2023** and **$36.5M in 2024**—about **70% below the peak**, yet still roughly **4× the 2020 baseline**, suggesting a market recalibration after an overheated period[^121]. The region appears to have no shortage of interested corporations, but rather a deficit of dependable avenues. To convert laboratory findings into corporate validation, it is essential to establish repeatable pilot programs, foster collaborations between studios and venture capital/corporate venture capital firms, and standardize data-room documentation. This will provide clear, high-conviction opportunities for capital deployment when it returns at scale. ### CVC-Startup matchmaking Amid this evolving market, a new generation of accelerators, venture studios, and consultancies are professionalizing the matchmaking process between startups and corporations. These intermediaries help founders across the region to proactively tap into international CVC networks—showcasing their breakthroughs at leading conferences and roadshows—while aligning their IP strategies, regulatory plans, and development timelines with the priorities of potential corporate partners. Plus, regional firms like [414 Capital](https://www.414capital.com/), [Pragmatec](https://pragmatec.com.mx/), [Bluebox](https://www.blueboxmx.com/), [New Venture Groups](https://www.nvgroup.org/) and [New Genesis](https://newgenesis.cl/servicios-start-ups/), for instance, have incorporated corporate investment into their value propositions, offering viable alternatives for startup founders who face challenges scaling their services. These programs help out with a problem heavily reported by our stakeholders: research participants point to an over-reliance on personal connections to secure investments. While personal ties are not considered best practice for obtaining funding, they frequently become the default mechanism in an environment where many investors lack a thorough understanding of R&D and innovation. Consequently, these personal connections often end up serving as the critical lever for unlocking larger funding rounds. A **neutral matchmaking program** with transparent intake, common NDAs, and shared data‑room templates—plus **quarterly demo days** with pre‑declared themes and clear milestone criteria—can shift the model from relationship‑only to **evidence‑driven**. **Illustrative Intermediaries:** * **The Ganesha Lab**: LATAM biotech accelerator bridging the funding gap via education, mentorship, and market access. It also organizes international events and "small missions" to connect startups with global networks, including early CVC access[^122] * **Startuplab.01**: public-private initiative based in Chile that catalyzes Deep Tech startups by providing cutting-edge laboratory infrastructure for entrepreneurs in biology and related fields. It offers hands-on technical and commercial guidance through an acceleration process, plus corporate connections[^123]. * **Wayra Hispam**: Operated by Telefónica’s innovation hub, Wayra Hispam co-invests in startups alongside TheVentureCity. It leverages Telefónica’s corporate resources and networks to integrate startups into its ecosystem. Offers up to $250K per startup in co-investments and facilitates corporate partnerships for scaling businesses regionally and globally[^124]. * **CMPC Venture Capital:** CVC arm of a Chilean multinational, invests in sustainable innovation and next-gen materials. They led a €4.8 million seed round for Strong by Form, a Chilean startup creating wood-based biocomposites as an eco-friendly alternative to concrete and steel, to scale their growth[^125]. #### Where SMEs fit (and why they matter) For corporates entering Deep Tech CVC, pairing with Small and Medium enterprises (SMEs) can turn abstract science into operational proof quickly, while reducing reliance on personal networks. SMEs are the backbone of Latin America's economy, making up 99% of its firms and employing about two-thirds of the workforce[^126]. Their agility, faster decision-making, and direct feedback loops make them a natural testbed for Deep Tech pilots in agriculture, Industry 4.0, and mobility. This makes them ideal early adopters, particularly where new technology can show quick and visible results. This dynamic creates a compelling environment for innovation, as evidenced by pilot data. Industry 4.0 pilots have been shown to improve productivity by 10–30% and reduce waste or downtime[^127]. In agriculture, pilots can raise yields and cut input use[^128]. In practical terms: SMEs provide the **short‑cycle proof points** corporates and CVCs want before committing larger checks. #### Recommendations: A Deep-Tech CVC Bridge for LATAM Latin America needs a neutral Deep-Tech CVC Bridge to close the gap between its most promising science-based startups and the global corporate funds that can propel them beyond Series A. With fewer regional companies operating venture arms than in other innovation hubs, founders still rely heavily on personal introductions. A dedicated bridge—co-run by organisations like the LADP, leading accelerators and supported by a multilateral institution—would organise recurring virtual pitch days and cross-border roadshows, offer a standardised CVC-ready data-room template, and maintain an open database of corporate investors and their thematic priorities. By professionalising matchmaking and shortening diligence cycles, the bridge would turn sporadic encounters into a predictable pipeline of strategic capital. The Bridge can **anchor a regional CVC × Deep Tech Observatory**, filling key data gaps: CVC participation, survival/attrition, time-to-next-round, procurement conversion, plus a LATAM benchmark of bankruptcy rates with vs. without CVC support in the region, as measured in Europe by Hello Tomorrow. By releasing **open, anonymized dashboards** through **standardized reporting**, the Observatory can shift the market from relationship-driven to **evidence-driven** decisions. For corporates entering the market, CVC programs should target SME clusters in relevant sectors, keep pilots small-scope and short (8–12 weeks), and focus on one clear KPI. Public co-funding from national or IDB/CAF programs can lower costs and speed adoption. Not every technology will fit SME testing, but where needs match — such as precision agriculture, predictive maintenance, or fleet optimization — SMEs can offer a faster, lower-risk route to market. --- ## The New Battlefronts of Tech ### Why Latin America is a Lab for the New World Order World politics is tending towards a paradox. Geopolitics is restoring Cold War dynamics, with states seeking technological autonomy that guarantees superiority over adversaries. However, national governments have scarcer means and more dependencies, on each other and on new actors such as technological multinationals. The geography of innovation has significantly changed and “No country alone can make an iPhone today,” as economist Eric Beinhocker aptly puts it[^129]. The return of spheres of influence is taking place in a world of hardwired networks, where old alliances have become less certain, with the United States taking distance from NATO[^130]. This combination is creating new battlefronts for critical technologies, where large and small countries play a new game of appropriation *versus* autonomy. This trend is evident in regions like Latin America. Many Latin American countries hold an indispensable supply of resources for the development of Deep Tech, from raw materials to energy, and new markets. Yet, they have had, so far, wasteful institutions, disjointed ecosystems, and fragile economies to affirm themselves as strong players in global tech. Hence, they have lent themselves mostly to appropriation, giving away precious resources in exchange for basic infrastructure. Now that there is less West and more Rest in geopolitics, how will resource-rich places like Latam re-align to the emerging world dis-order? ### The Politics of Appropriation in a Networked World In 1945, Vannevar Bush published Science*: The Endless Frontier*. His prescient pamphlet advocated that the United States had to invest in what today we would call *Deep Tech*, to engineer advantages in knowledge into economic and military competitiveness. The world had been divided into two spheres of influence: the American West and the Soviet East. While the US could trust the Soviet Union as long as they had common enemies, peace required assurances against a possible, formidable adversary. Therefore, industrial autonomy was needed to sustain and defend one’s sphere of influence. Bush wrote: > *“A nation which depends upon others for its **new basic scientific knowledge** will be slow in its **industrial progress** and weak in its **competitive position** in world trade, regardless of its mechanical skill.”* Eighty years after the publication of *Science: The Endless Frontier*, Vannevar Bush’s predictions have become the doctrines of states, from the US to China. Today, geopolitical preparedness *is* technological preparedness, and *vice versa*. We are back to the ‘60s: competition between states plays out at the technological frontier. The new Space Race is broader and more complex than the Sputnik era, ranging from Artificial Intelligence to Quantum Technologies to Biotechnologies. Now like then, breakthroughs in innovation are breakthroughs in preparedness and preemption. Every investment in inventions is a dual-use investment in a world where alliances are more fragile and conflicts are more frequent. Later on, in 1970, Bush produced another timeless work, *Pieces of Action*, where he stated: > **“**In order for great progress to be made on methods and weapons of war, there has to be **a system of close joint effort of military and civilian men, especially engineers.** The civilians must have independence and the opportunity to explore the bizarre; it is not enough that they be the engineers or contractors to the armed forces. Above all, there must be mutual respect and reliance. This must be present whenever we have to fight again.**”** Today, the United States, China, the European Union and others are trying to repatriate these capabilities, where possible, or appropriate them. This approach is evident in the latest changes in American policy, where the Trump Administration is using tariffs as a tool to coerce adversaries and allies alike into buying or becoming Made in the USA. It’s a tit-for-tat – or eye for eye – that includes everything from the Ukraine mineral deal in exchange for protection, to the bullying of Canada into becoming American, to tariff and immigration wars with Latin American nations, to forcing the purchase of US dollars to sustain the country’s unsustainable deficit. The Biden administration had already started, imposing export controls on technologies deemed critical for national security and offering chunky carrots to build American in America through the Inflation Reduction Act. In 2022, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), for instance, received $6.6 billion in direct funding and $5 billion in low-cost loans through the CHIPS Act to build a foundry in Arizona, away from Chinese influence. As a result of the US Government’s tariff touting, TSMC announced *they* would invest an additional $100 billion to expand its advanced semiconductor manufacturing operations in Arizona[^131]. As for China, they understood early that geography is destiny, again. In fact, part of China’s National Development and Reform Commission 2024 directives include a strategic positioning of their Deep Tech industries in the global landscape, “as a result of a “shift on the international balance of power that is transforming the traditional division of global labor– the rise of the East and a relative decline of the West.”[^132]. China has been building a network of Silk Roads worldwide, where silk is the natural resources and minerals that are quintessential to building new tech. As Ángel Melguizo and Margaret Myers put it, “as geopolitical conditions limit China’s tech investment and trade prospects in developed country markets, many of China’s ICT and high-end manufacturing companies have sought to engage more extensively with Latin America and the Caribbean and other parts of the Global South”[^133]. If the iPhone cannot come to China, then China goes to the iPhones – as the old saying goes. Now, China is venturing to LATAM regarding Deep Tech. Why? ### China’s Deep Tech Plans China has woven Deep Technology into the fabric of its long-term development model, positioning it as a pillar of an innovation-driven, self-reliant economy for a while. While the release of DeepSeek — the Chinese foundation model that stunned the global AI community with its multimodal accuracy and parameter-efficiency — looked like an overnight sensation, it was anything but. Deep Tech –aka “New Infrastructure, as it’s referred to in China– sits at the heart of China’s strategy for sustainable, innovation-led growth, a priority woven into top-level policy blueprints and regulations. The country’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) spells out an extensive support system for Deep Tech progress[^134], while the 2021 Science and Technology Progress Law reaffirms Beijing’s determination to keep pushing frontier research that can reshape industry[^135]. Translating these goals into action, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—together with six other ministries—has recently spotlighted a roster of “future industries” (quantum computing, 6G, space technologies, next-generation materials, among others) as pillars of China’s new “quality productive forces.” The message is clear: Deep Tech fields will anchor the nation’s next phase of economic modernization. Countries seeking to boost their own Deep Tech capacity can look to this integrated, long-range approach as a template for sustaining innovation-driven growth. A flagship element of China’s Deep Tech push is the **“20 + 8” cluster agenda**, which earmarks twenty strategic emerging industries and eight forward-looking fields—biotechnology, next-generation ICT, advanced manufacturing, and more—and bundles them into regional hubs where companies, research institutes and investors can collaborate at scale[^136]. Complementing this, the Chinese Communist Party has rolled out a suite of ecosystem-building programmes. In **November 2022** the Ministries of Science & Technology and Education green-lit ten **pilot “future industry” parks** in eight provinces and municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi and Heilongjiang)[^137]. Each site combines co-creation spaces, incubators, accelerators and full industrial parks, underpinned by a **30-point talent scheme** designed to lure top global researchers and founders[^138]. The payoff is visible: between **2017 and 2022, Deep Tech’s share of total domestic tech investment jumped from 15% to 71%**, reflecting how quickly capital has followed this coordinated policy drive[^139]. Moreover, China’s Deep Tech market is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 19.2% through 2034—outpacing the **15.6% CAGR projected for the United States** and trailing only **Australia & New Zealand’s 22% trajectory**[^140]. When looking at the industries of investment, the biotech sector dominated Deep Tech investments until , attracting roughly $22 billion in private capital—a figure that was double that of the next largest vertical, computer hardware. However, 2022 marked a significant pivot: biotech investments contracted sharply to $10 billion, while the EV, AV, and Automotive Technology segment surged from $7.9 billion to $11.1 billion, thereby seizing the top position. #### Tangible Outcomes of China’s Deep-Tech Push Since, China has begun to harvest visible technological dividends. In **January 2025 Beijing-based DeepSeek released its DeepSeek-R1 model**, matching the best U.S. foundation models while training on far leaner compute budgets; analysts now describe its open-weight successor (R1-0528) as one of the strongest code-generation systems outside Silicon Valley[^141]. The same “thrift-at-scale” mindset underpins **ManusAI**, a Chinese agentic platform many observers rate above current state-of-the-art[^142]. Quantum ambitions are also keeping pace. A recent paper unveiled **Zuchongzhi 3.0**, a 105-qubit superconducting processor whose architecture mirrors Google’s Willow chip and executes sampling tasks that stump classical supercomputers[^143]. Hardware supremacy is most obvious on the road: Chinese brands now account for **about 60% of global EV sales**, and in 2024 **BYD shipped 4.27 million vehicles and booked USD 107 billion in revenue—outstripping Tesla’s 1.79 million deliveries and USD 97.7 billion top line[^144]**. Furthermore, in March 2025 the General-Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party unveiled a **US $138 billion** public-private fund to bankroll “Deep Tech” ventures—quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, next-generation renewables—projects so high-risk and long-horizon that few states dare to underwrite them. Scale matters: the quantum component alone is **almost 30 times larger** than the combined quantum programmes of the United States and European Union. Framed as a response to post-Trump trade wars and an increasingly fractious world order, Beijing pitched the initiative as a way for *“AI to become a positive energy for cooperation and multilateralism,”* but the subtext is unmistakable: China intends to redraw global value chains and secure technological self-reliance. ### Chinese Engagement in LATAM The United States and Europe still dominate Latin America’s investment landscape. In 2023, they supplied roughly **33%** and **22%** of the region’s total incoming FDI, respectively, according to ECLAC. China, by contrast, registered a negligible **0.4%**—a steep drop from the 3% it posted the year before[^145]. Even sources that cast Beijing’s position in a brighter light, such as the *China Overseas Foreign Direct Investment Monitor for Latin America and the Caribbean*, put its 2023 outlay at just **US $8.8 billion**, or about **10%** of all FDI arriving in the region[^146]. Yet momentum is clearly shifting: the European Union now projects that by **2035 China will have become Latin America’s single largest trading partner[^147]**, a turn that could reshape supply chains, technology partnerships and, ultimately, the competitive playing field for Deep Tech ventures in LATAM. On top of their domestic “New Infrastructure” plans, part of China’s directives include a strategic positioning of their Deep Tech industries in the global landscape. In a [letter](https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202404/t20240428_1366248.html) published on June 2024 by the National Development and Reform Commission, they **elevate the role of emerging and developing countries in R&D and high-tech industries as a result of a “shift on the international balance of power that is transforming the traditional division of global labor– the rise of the East and a relative decline of the West”.** Not coincidentally, research by Melguizo and Myers shows that: > "The number of Chinese projects in Latin America grew by 33 per cent from 2018-2023, compared with the previous five-year period of 2013-2017, even as the total value declined. In other words, Chinese companies are making more investments in the region but are pursuing smaller-scale projects on average. These investments are also more focused “New Infraestrucure”. In 2022, 60 per cent of China’s investments were in these frontier sectors, a key economic priority for the country.[^148]” Do not be fooled by the decline in total investment by China. In reality, the Chinese government and companies recalibrated the sectors in which they invest – from brick-and-mortar to high-tech. Chinese investments shifted from canals, rails, and energy infrastructure, to Deep Tech, “consistent with Beijing’s laser focus on its own economic upgrading and global competitiveness”. In fact, in 2022, China's Ministry of Science and Technology had explicitly committed to enhancing scientific and technological cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries, with specific emphasis on technology transfer and innovation in sustainable development[^149]. When we polled regional stakeholders about China’s footprint in Latin-American deal flow, most admitted they have **yet to see sizeable cheques hit the ground**. Interest is unmistakably rising—particularly in biotech and ag-tech—but, so far, curiosity has not matured into transactions large enough to bend the market’s arc. Still, those same stakeholders state that the real inflection point arrives when states unleash large-scale public capital—and Beijing is already teeing that up. In March 2025, China launched a **US $138 billion sovereign vehicle** to bankroll “high-risk, long-horizon” plays in quantum computing, AI, cutting-edge chips and clean energy[^150]. Beijing framed the move as a response to trade-war turbulence, promising that “AI will become a positive energy for cooperation and multilateralism,” yet the subtext is plain: China aims to redraw global value chains and lock in technological self-reliance. Only two months later, China rolled out a **US $9 billion credit facility for Latin-American governments[^151]**. The signal could not be clearer: China’s Deep Tech surge is inseparable from its bid to broaden their economic—and therefore geopolitical—ties across the hemisphere. ### Middle Powers: A New Path for Deep Tech Advancement While China’s Deep Tech strategy illustrates the scale and ambition that a global superpower can bring, LATAM countries face a dilemma: reliance on a single dominant partner risks overdependence and limits strategic flexibility. At the same time, partnerships with the United States are increasingly constrained by trade tensions, export controls, and shifting geopolitical priorities. In this context, LATAM cannot simply emulate the superpower model; instead, it can diversify its partnerships to access advanced technology, patient capital, and know-how without compromising autonomy. This is where partnering with “middle powers” –technologically advanced, non-superpower nations such as Israel, South Korea, Singapore, Canada, Japan, the Gulf states and Australia– offers a strategic path forward. These countries occupy a sweet spot: they're technologically sophisticated and financially robust without the baggage that comes with superpower status. They need partners, not dependants, and combine world-class innovation ecosystems with agile foreign policies, making them ideal collaborators for LATAM[^152]. In fact, LATAM startups and policymakers are already adopting international best practices from leading ecosystems. Currently, however, private-sector R&D funding in Latin America accounts for only 43% of total R&D expenditure—a sharp contrast to the 80% contribution seen in a major innovation hub like Israel[^153]. LATAM faces three fundamental challenges that middle power partnerships can address directly. The first is capital, specifically, the kind of **patient capital** that allows Deep Tech to mature. Sovereign wealth funds and state-backed investors from middle powers can provide this in ways that traditional venture capital often can't[^154]. The second is **knowledge transfer**: LATAM has strong research talent but limited access to global innovation networks; middle powers can connect the region to these hubs without the strings often attached to superpower partnerships. The third is **strategic autonomy**: overreliance on any single partner creates vulnerabilities, but a diversified alliance with multiple middle powers spreads risk and strengthens resilience. These partnerships succeed because they are built on mutual need rather than charity. Middle powers themselves face constraints—limited domestic markets, aging populations, or resource dependencies—and they need what LATAM offers: young talent, expanding markets, and critical raw materials. By aligning complementary strengths, LATAM and middle powers can co-create new Deep Tech ecosystems that advance competitiveness, sustainability, and strategic autonomy. #### Comparative Case Studies of Middle-Power Strategies **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** Gulf states are rapidly diversifying their economies into tech and sustainability and, the UAE has taken the lead in LATAM[^155]. Over the past twelve months, the UAE has signed Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPAs) with six LATAMn countries–Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, and Brazil, committed more than US $100 billion in targeted investments, and launched hyperscale data centers to meet the region’s surging AI demand. Colombia offers one of the clearest examples of this strategy. Following a CEPA in April 2024, a series of Memoranda of Understanding MoU quickly followed, including the opening of a Dubai Chambers office in Bogotá and the announcement of three hyperscale data centers to be built by G42, one of the UAE’s largest tech investment firms[^156]. These developments, framed as part of a broader strategy to deepen ties in frontier technologies, resulted in a 51% year-over-year increase in non-oil bilateral trade. Costa Rica has seen similarly fast results. A CEPA that entered into force in February 2024 has already doubled non-oil trade between the two nations[^157]. Chile, after finalizing its own accord in July 2024, is now implementing tax and customs incentives designed to accelerate Emirati-backed technology ventures[^158]. Mexico entered the framework in June 2025 with a pact elevating semiconductors and AI to top-priority status, swiftly echoed by Ecuador the following month[^159]. Beyond digital infrastructure, the UAE has also moved into resource security. In January 2025, Brazil signed a $2.5 billion MoU with the UAE focused on strategic minerals including copper, and lithium and supporting technologies[^160]. The agreement, concluded between Brazil’s Mines & Energy Ministry and the UAE’s Ministry of Investment, includes explicit provisions for the transfer of cutting-edge technologies from the UAE to Brazil for exploration and processing[^161]. Taken together, these initiatives illustrate how the UAE leverages both digital and resource-based investments to become a strategic middle-power partner, providing capital, technology, and infrastructure while helping LATAM diversify its global partnerships beyond the traditional great powers. **Canada** In 2020 Brazil’s innovation agency Embrapii and Canada’s National Research Council (NRC) launched a co-funded R&D program under the Canadian International Innovation Program (CIIP). Starting April 2021, this scheme finances joint Brazil-Canada projects in sectors like AI, Internet of Things and advanced manufacturing[^162]. Eligible areas include agriculture, health and mining (with a sustainability bias). The initiative is one of the region’s clearest examples of a bilateral R&D partnership structured to support Deep Tech commercialization through government-backed co-investment. While Brazil remains the primary partner, CIIP’s broader geographic scope also covers other middle powers, suggesting a pathway for LATAM countries to push for inclusion in future calls or to adopt similar mechanisms for regional cooperation. **Japan** In 2024 Japan and Brazil upgraded their strategic partnership to address **energy transition** needs[^163]. Their Joint Action Plan pledges to strengthen mineral value chains – specifically, adding value to Brazil’s mining output – and to share technical knowledge on recycling and processing (e.g. battery-grade lithium refinement). The plan also calls for exchanging semiconductor policy experience (a nod to Brazil’s nascent chip strategy). Japan has already co-invested in LATAM lithium projects (Panasonic in Bolivia, Toyota in Argentina) and Japan International Cooperation Agency invested $1 billion to a new private-sector fund, the JICA-TADAC Fund, managed by IDB Invest[^164]. More broadly, Japan’s technology, from robotics to precision farming, can transfer to LATAM through MOUs and joint labs. These agreements exemplify how partnerships can evolve to hardware, software and human capital, rather than just raw imports. **Singapore and Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreements hubs** Singapore acts as a gateway between East Asian technology and LATAMn markets. It has negotiated a Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile, and signed the Pacific Alliance–Singapore FTA to streamline trade with Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile[^165]. Singaporean officials highlight LATAM’s booming tech sector (fintech, AI, e-mobility, etc.) and seek to **co-innovate** with LATAM firms[^166]. For instance, Singapore’s innovation agencies sponsor trade missions to Mexico and Brazil, linking local startups with Asian ecosystem partners. Beyond trade diplomacy, Singapore has built one of the world’s most structured Deep Tech venture ecosystems. Programs like NUS GRIP, A*StartCentral, and NTUitive turn research into startups, while hubs such as BLOCK71 connect talent, investors, and corporates. Agencies like SGInnovate, Enterprise Singapore, and Temasek-backed Xora Innovation provide patient capital and commercialization pathways, complemented by private accelerators[^167]. For LATAM, Singapore’s model shows how venture-building infrastructure can accelerate the path from lab to market and offers a template for joint funds, regional hubs, and exchange programs. **South Korea** South Korea is supporting Chile in addressing challenges in battery minerals and energy transition, including developing lithium processing capacity and modernizing mining operations. Chilean officials have pursued MoUs on battery minerals and hydrogen technology with Korean agencies. Although not exclusively with South Korea, Chile and Korean partners have been collaborating on lithium joint ventures with state firms Codelco and ENAMI, with Korean industry investing in projects that include local processing to add value. In addition, South Korea and Chile signed a 2021 MoU to cooperate on green hydrogen, leveraging Chile’s renewable energy resources. On the technology side, Chile is adopting Industry 4.0 in its mines: autonomous trucks, AI-based ore-sorting and integrated operations centers are now operational, mirroring best practices in Korea’s own smart manufacturing[^168]. #### Implementation Frameworks The case studies of the UAE, South Korea, Canada, Japan, and Singapore illustrate how LATAM can engage with middle powers to advance Deep Tech capabilities while avoiding overdependence on any single great power. Each partnership highlights a different strategic lever: the UAE brings patient capital and infrastructure investment; South Korea offers industrial innovation tied to energy transition; Canada demonstrates how co-funded R&D programs can build joint capacity; Japan aligns technology transfer with value-chain upgrading; and Singapore provides a bridge to rule-based digital and trade frameworks. Taken together, these approaches underscore the central hypothesis of this chapter: LATAM does not need to choose between the United States and China to build its technological future. By working with a diversified portfolio of middle powers, the region can access world-class innovation ecosystems, patient capital, and targeted knowledge transfer while maintaining strategic independence. The strategies that emerge across these examples are consistent. 1. **Joint investment vehicles:** Co-financing and blended-finance mechanisms are essential for scaling Deep Tech initiatives. Models like the Canada–Brazil CIIP (via Embrapii and NRC) illustrate successful bilateral co-investment in R&D and startups[^169]. Multilateral institutions such as the IDB Venture Lab or CAF could co-host innovation funds with Singaporean or UAE capital, while sovereign wealth funds (e.g., Temasek, Mubadala) could allocate resources to LATAMn tech consortia. 2. **Technology transfer mechanisms need formal structure:** Formal R&D partnerships, secondments, and co-located labs accelerate learning and capability building. Examples include Chile–Korea cooperation on hydrogen and smart mining, Canada–Brazil collaboration in nanotechnology and advanced manufacturing, and Japan–Brazil agreements on mineral processing and semiconductor policy. These cases show that technology transfer works best when tied to formal agreements and co-investment. Encouraging multinationals from these middle powers to establish regional R&D centers, supported by targeted tax incentives, can further embed know-how locally. 3. **Talent Mobility and Ecosystem Integration** Exchange programs, fellowships, and targeted visas foster skill development and ecosystem integration. Bilateral programs such as the Korea–Chile technical committee on mining and energy, Canada–Brazil joint research fellowships, and Japan’s JICA-backed training initiatives demonstrate scalable models Success will require new forms of technological diplomacy, coordinated regional action, and the political will to think beyond traditional alliance structures. The case of Airbus can serve as a useful historical precedent for a consortium created for industrial and technological sovereignty—what began as a European response to American dominance in commercial aviation became one of the world's most successful examples of multinational industrial cooperation[^170]. The convergence of global technological competition, shifting geopolitical alignments, and LATAM's growing capabilities creates a unique window of opportunity. ### Appropriation vs Autonomy – The Latin American Dilemma The new Chinese Digital Silk Road to LATAM could find greater space in the emptiness left by crumbling multilateralism and traditional alliances being weakened by trade wars. The wave of export controls issued by the Trump administration is aimed at slowing China down on its path to Artificial General Intelligence[^171]. But will that be enough contingency? First, DeepSeek has stunned techies and markets by releasing competitive AI models at a fraction of the cost of American rivals, showing that the Chinese model for top-down execution can be equally effective and more resourceful. Second, the battle for chips is crucial yet only in front of the war for technological supremacy. China has started building its policies of coercion and appropriation well before its rivals, anticipating that value-based alliances would be replaced by interest-based ones. As Martin Wolf wrote in the Financial Times[^172]: "It is possible that some allies will decide that, although they prefer the US, China is at least more predictable. That would be an insane position for these countries to be in. But it would be the almost inevitable result of Trump’s gangsterish approach to international relations." In fact, the new Cold War is much hotter on more fronts and with more players than the US and China wanting to take the stage. Take India, which now ranks in the top 5 in 45 of 64 technologies that are deemed critical by ASPI[^173]. Take Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are spending hundreds of billions of petro-dollars to become technological and geopolitical hubs. This might change now, with geopolitics being more populous and driven by more selfish interests. Today, as Monica Duffy Toft aptly puts it: “regime type no longer appears to hinder a sense of shared interests. It is hard power only—and a return to the ancient principle that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” In such a world, multilateral institutions such as NATO[^174] and the EU would be sidelined and the autonomy of smaller nations threatened.” With less West and more Rest contending for tech dominance, Latin America will surely be a new battleground for innovation. Who appropriates what remains to be seen. Our objective with the LADP is to present a holistic perspective on the state of Deep Tech and provide critical insights into the scaling challenges for the region. More importantly, however, we aim to go above and beyond in order to present a practical series of recommendations on what we as a region must do in order to advance the investment landscape into the technologies that will shape our future. This process involves the meticulous development of robust intellectual property and a lengthy, strategic technology transfer from academia to the commercial sector, setting the indispensable foundation for groundbreaking, commercial innovation. Successfully bridging this critical gap necessitates sustained investment and tailored support mechanisms, facilitating the arduous yet rewarding journey from scientific discovery to market-ready solutions. By systematically nurturing this intricate ecosystem, the region can unlock its full potential, transforming cutting-edge research into tangible economic growth and global leadership in Deep Tech. --- ## Bibliography [^1]: Josemaria Siota and Mª Julia Prats, [Open Innovation: How Corporate Giants Can Better Collaborate with Deep-Tech Start-ups. The Case of East and Southeast Asia](https://www.iese.edu/insight/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/04/2021_Open-Innovation_Corporate-venturing-Asia_Siota-Prats.pdf) IESE Business School (2021). [^2]: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), [Ciencia, tecnología e innovación: cooperación, integración y desafíos regionales](https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/39481486-daef-49d9-b5a0-3eec708a9ded/content) [^3]: Ángel Melguizo & Margaret Myers, [Ahead of the curve: Why the EU and US risk falling behind China in Latin America](https://ecfr.eu/article/ahead-of-the-curve-why-the-eu-and-us-risk-falling-behind-china-in-latin-america/?utm_source=chatgpt.com), European Council on Foreign Relations (2024). [^4]: Markus Berger-de León, Karel Dörner, Hannes Erntell & Tobias Henz, [European deep tech: What investors and corporations need to know](https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/european-deep-tech-what-investors-and-corporations-need-to-know), McKinsey & Company (2024). [^5]: Steven Jacobs, Lukas Leitner, Nicolas Autret, and Lorenzo Chiavarini, [The 2025 European Deep Tech Report](https://dealroom.co/uploaded/2024/11/2025-European-Deep-Tech-Report.pdf) Dealroom.co (2025). [^6]: [More 140 million denied access health care Latin America and Caribbean](https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/more-140-million-denied-access-health-care-latin-america-and-caribbean), International Labour Organization (1999). [^7]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Latin America and the Caribbean in PISA 2022: How did the Region Perform](https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-in-PISA-2022-How-did-the-Region-Perform.pdf) (IADB, 2022). [^8]: OECD, [Government at a Glance: Latin America and the Caribbean 2024](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/government-at-a-glance-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-2024_4abdba16-en.html), OECD Publishing (2024). [^9]: International Labour Organization, [Executive Summary](https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2025-02/PL%202024_english_ExecutiveSummary_Embargoed_.pdf) ILO (2025). [^10]: Pau Castells, Lucrecia Corvalan, and Facundo Rattel, [Connectivity Gaps in Latin America: A Roadmap for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador](https://www.gsma.com/about-us/regions/latin-america/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/FINAL-Brechas-de-conectividad-en-America-Latina_-SHORT-report-ENGLISH-DIGITAL.pdf) GSMA ( 2023). [^11]: Estefania Vergara Cobos & Hualong Diao [From Fiction to Reality: How Latin America became the world's most critical cyber battleground](https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/seguridad-cibernetica-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe), World Bank Blogs (2024). [^12]: [Lithium: Here's why Latin America is key to the global energy transition](https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/01/lithium-latin-america-energy-transition), World Economic Forum (2023). [^13]: UNCTAD, [World Investment Report 2025: International investment in the digital economy](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2025_en.pdf) (Geneva: United Nations, 2025). [^14]: UNCTAD, [World Investment Report 2025: International investment in the digital economy](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2025_en.pdf) (Geneva: United Nations, 2025). [^15]: Fausto Carbajal Glass, [Strategic Reconfiguration of North American Competitiveness: Mexico's Role in Regional Value Network Integration](https://scsp222.substack.com/p/isf-voices-2025-regionalizing-competitiveness), *ISF Voices 2025, Special Competitive Studies Project (2025).* [^16]: Indira Romero & Jesús Antonio López Cabrera,[Nearshoring in Mexico: Seizing Opportunities and Facing Challenges](https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/nearshoring-mexico-seizing-opportunities-and-facing-challenges), *Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (2024).* [^17]: Thomas Monteiro,[Latin America: Nearshoring Boost](https://gfmag.com/economics-policy-regulation/latin-america-nearshoring-boost/), *Global Finance Magazine* (2024). [^18]: Indira Romero & Jesús Antonio López Cabrera,[Nearshoring in Mexico: Seizing Opportunities and Facing Challenges](https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/nearshoring-mexico-seizing-opportunities-and-facing-challenges), *Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University (2024).* [^19]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^20]: EMERGE, [Deep Tech Radar LATAM 2025](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1fwjPy_iBrk5BfcrMPoN7-lrEv7-DZx6T) (2025) [^21]: Claudio Cifuentes, [Investors Roundtable: A Stronger Regional Coalition with Global Reach](https://blog.ladp.io/p/investors-roundtable-a-stronger-regional), LADP Blog (2025). [^22]: [Shenzhen hits national firsts in 2024, targets 5.5% GDP growth in 2025](https://www.ecns.cn/cns-wire/2025-02-27/detail-ihepcskv6108678.shtml), ECNS (2025) [^23]: CINDE and PROCOMER FTZ Impact studies; Intel and Databricks company releases. [^24]: Uruguay XXI reports; Satellogic and Newlab announcements; Ministry of Economy trade data. [^25]: [Deep Tech Overview: Latin America](https://app.dealroom.co/sector/technology/Deep%20Tech/overview?hqType=regions&hqValue=Latin+America), Dealroom.co [^26]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^27]: Hello Tomorrow, [Deep Tech Investors Mapping - Public version](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1BqNO7l4kXRhjG5jcB89FwRlhuRKBwBKtV7ZHwwLjPhk/edit?gid=0#gid=0), Hello Tomorrow (Google Sheets) (n.d.). [^28]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^29]: David Matthews, [Europe overtakes Asia on deep tech investment](https://sciencebusiness.net/news/europe-overtakes-asia-deep-tech-investment), *Science | Business* (2024). [^30]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^31]: [LATAM startup market 2024 in review](https://slinghub.io/reports/Q324), SlingHub (2024). [^32]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^33]: Itaú BBA Equity Strategy Team, [Latam & Brazil Equity Strategy: Thematic Book](https://mindassets.cloud.itau.com.br/attachments/facd8655-6db0-4dfb-a25b-1e3d2fd76050/EQUITY_STRATEGY_THEMATIC_BOOK_20240513.pdf), Itaú BBA Equity Strategy Team (2024) [^34]: [MSCI Emerging Markets Latin America Index (USD)](https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/5b537e9c-ab98-49e4-88b5-bf0aed926b9b), MSCI (2025). [^35]: Mike Dolan, [Emerging markets face 'why bother?' problem](https://www.reuters.com/markets/emerging-markets-face-why-bother-problem-mike-dolan-2024-01-12/), Reuters (2024). [^36]: Cristián Hernández Cuevas, [Catalysts of Change: The Future of Biotechnology in Latin America](https://cristianhernandez.org/en/catalysts-of-change/) (2025). [^37]: Scenius LATAM, [GridX: The Matchmaker for Scientists & Business profiles in Latin America](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/gridx-matchmaker-scientists-business-profiles-latin-america-nfqte/?trackingId=rt%2BbOIvsnxMZJVd%2FCUUbdQ%3D%3D), LinkedIn (2024). [^38]: [Deep Tech Summit, Emerge](https://emergebrasil.in/deep-tech-summit/) (2025). [^39]: [Deep Tech, Venture Capital and Innovation](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/drapercygnus_deeptech-venturecapital-innovation-activity-7287455135776083968-9Zdh/), Draper Cygnus, LinkedIn (2025). [^40]: [The Venture Capital Panel](https://lu.ma/wjc8vmxr), The Venture Capital Panel (2025). [^41]: [The Venture Capital Summit](https://mentex.co/summit/), MenteX (2025). [^42]: [Brochure BIGinB10 Program](https://files.theganeshalab.world/Brochure-BIGinB10-Program-2025.pdf), The Ganesh Lab (2025). [^43]: Cristián Hernández Cuevas, [Catalysts of Change: The Future of Biotechnology in Latin America](https://cristianhernandez.org/en/catalysts-of-change/) (2025). [^44]: [UNDP Global Deep Tech Ecosystems](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-06/undp-global-deep-tech-ecosystems.pdf), United Nations Development Programme (2025). [^45]: [Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) Progress in Latin America: Uruguay Becomes the Newest Contracting Member](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/07/patent-cooperation-treaty-pct-progress-in-latin-america-uruguay-becomes-the-newest-contracting-member), Mayer Brown (2024). [^46]: [An investors guide to deep tech](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a8/e4/d3f2698b436aa0f23aed168cd2ef/bcg-an-investors-guide-to-deep-tech-nov-2023-1.pdf), Boston Consulting Group (2023). [^47]: EMERGE, [Deep Tech Radar LATAM 2025](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1fwjPy_iBrk5BfcrMPoN7-lrEv7-DZx6T) (2025) [^48]: [Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research](https://www.iai.int/en/) (IAI), IAI (last accessed 2025). [^49]: Cristián Hernández Cuevas, [Catalysts of Change: The Future of Biotechnology in Latin America](https://cristianhernandez.org/en/catalysts-of-change/) (2025). [^50]: [Próspera](https://www.prospera.co/en), Próspera (last accessed 2025). [^51]: [Minicircle Gene Therapy Case Study](https://info.prospera.hn/downloads/Minicircle%20Gene%20Therapy%20Case%20Study.pdf), Próspera (2024). [^52]: Antonio Regalado, [Inside the private country where a biohacker says he gave people gene therapy](https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/02/13/1068330/minicircle-prospera-honduras-biohacking-follistatin-gene-therapy/), MIT Technology Review (2023). [^53]: Jack D. Farchy, [Honduras’s Free-Zone Experiment Is Failing](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/24/honduras-zedes-us-prospera-world-bank-biden-castro/), Foreign Policy (2024). [^54]: [Próspera and others v. Honduras](https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/1292/pr-spera-and-others-v-honduras), UNCTAD (2022). [^55]: David Cendon Garcia, [EU-Inc calls on new Commission to turn the idea of a single pan-European startup entity into reality](https://www.eu-startups.com/2024/12/eu-inc-calls-on-new-commission-turn-the-idea-of-a-single-pan-european-startup-entity-into-reality/), EU-Startups.com (2024). [^56]: [Non-paper: How can a 28th regime company status help young and innovative companies to scale in Europe?](https://media.francedigitale.org/app/uploads/prod/2024/10/22114209/France-Digitale-Non-Paper-28-Regime.pdf), France Digitale (2024). [^57]: [Uruguay facilita trámites de energía y agua para inversores brasileños con un proceso 100% digital y seguro](https://vui.gub.uy/identificacion-digital-transfronteriza-brasil-uruguay/), Uruguay VUI (2023). [^58]: [MERCOSUR y Alianza del Pacífico dan un paso clave para agilizar la logística regional](https://www.infobae.com/movant/2025/05/28/mercosur-y-alianza-del-pacifico-dan-un-paso-clave-para-agilizar-la-logistica-regional), Infobae (2025). [^59]: [Panorama of Productive Development Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean](https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e01e15e6-0899-4e75-bd0e-29feb244ebee/content), ECLAC (2024). [^60]: [Directorio EBCT](https://observa.minciencia.gob.cl/encuestas/directorio-ebct), MinCiencia (last accessed 2025). [^61]: [Tercer Estudio de caracterización de Empresas de base científico-tecnológica en Chile](https://api.observa.minciencia.gob.cl/api/datosabiertos/download/?uuid=a2e11887-8a2f-4231-a601-f697c524dc8e&filename=Informe%20final%20EBCT3%202024.pdf), MinCiencia (2024). [^62]: [Corfo presenta nueva política pública para crear red nacional de hubs de emprendimientos de base científico tecnológica](https://www.corfo.cl/sites/cpp/sala_de_prensa/nacional/22_11_2024_startup_labs;jsessionid=OeVVF8fGZngrtAcSqvOb-zg2J4rax4o75elBla0_ya-Oy3hojknT!678775723!296284750), Corfo (2024). [^63]: [Sciencepreneurs - Deep Tech Colombia Report 2024](https://olartemoure.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sciencepreneurs_-DeepTech-Colombia-Report-2024-ENG.pdf#:~:text=We%20are%20a%20network%20of,impact%20in%20the%20global%20market), Olarte Moure (2024). [^64]: Jenny Lin, [Reviving Argentina's Small Business](https://flippingbook.lehigh.edu/Prospects%20Argentina/85/), Perspectives on Business and Economics (2021). [^65]: UNCTAD, [*World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones*](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2019_en.pdf) (2019). [^66]: [Shenzhen hits national firsts in 2024, targets 5.5% GDP growth in 2025](https://www.ecns.cn/cns-wire/2025-02-27/detail-ihepcskv6108678.shtml), *ECNS* (2025); [City has over 11 million employed people](https://www.sz.gov.cn/en_szgov/news/infocus/pda/news/content/post_7992310.html), *Shenzhen Government Online* (2020). [^67]: CINDE and PROCOMER FTZ Impact studies; Intel and Databricks company releases. [^68]: Stephen Ezel, [*Assessing the Dominican Republic’s Readiness to Play a Greater Role in Global Semiconductor and PCB Value Chains*](https://itif.org/publications/2024/01/29/dr-semiconductor-readiness/), Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (2024). [^69]: Uruguay XXI reports; Satellogic and Newlab announcements; Ministry of Economy trade data. [^70]: Sources: [Placeholder for specific sources related to Table 1] [^71]: Stephen Ezel, [*Assessing the Dominican Republic’s Readiness to Play a Greater Role in Global Semiconductor and PCB Value Chains*](https://itif.org/publications/2024/01/29/dr-semiconductor-readiness/), Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (2024); UNESCO-UNEVOC, [*Funding of Training: Dominican Republic*](https://unevoc.unesco.org/countryprofiles/docs/UNESCO_Funding-of-Training_Dominican-Republic.pdf) (2020). [^72]: Costa Rica’s Law No. 9728 (2019) establishes dual technical education; GOVET, “[*Almost five years of dual vocational education and training in Costa Rica*](https://www.govet.international/en/201967.php)” (2024), and INA, “[Formación Dual](https://www.ina.ac.cr/SitePages/Formacion_Dual.aspx)” (last accessed September 2025). [^73]: Uruguay XXI, “Finishing Schools” and FAQ; INEFOP, “Finishing Schools.” [^74]: The **Alliance for Development in Democracy (ADD)** is a sub-regional forum created in September 2021 by Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama (Ecuador joined in June 2022). [^75]: [Relatorio Deep Techs Brasil 2024](https://emergebrasil.in/panorama-startups-deep-tech-brasileiras/), EMERGE (2024) [^76]: [Costa Rica - Launched a semiconductor roadmap to attract FDI](https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor/measures/4603/costa-rica-launched-a-semiconductor-roadmap-to-attract-fdi), UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor (2024). [^77]: [Comisión Asesora Tecnologías Cuánticas](https://minciencia.gob.cl/areas/comision-asesora-tecnologias-cuanticas/), MinCiencia (last accessed 2025). [^78]: [Ciencia, tecnología e innovación: cooperación, integración y desafíos regionales](https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/39481486-daef-49d9-b5a0-3eec708a9ded/content), ECLAC (2022). [^79]: [Brazil Biotech Report](https://endeavor.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/brazilbiotechreport_EN.pdf), Endeavour (2024). [^80]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^81]: Nir Reuven, [Is Israel the “Start-Up Nation” Because of Its Unique Security Situation?](https://besacenter.org/is-israel-the-start-up-nation-because-of-its-unique-security-situation/), BESA Center (2023). [^82]: Anchal Vohra, [Israel’s Military-Technology Complex Is One of a Kind](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/19/israels-military-technology-complex-is-one-of-a-kind/), Foreign Policy (2023). [^83]: [Early Stage Tech Fund](https://wapp4.corfo.cl/fondoetapastempranas/index-en.html), Corfo (last accessed 2025). [^84]: [Programa de matching funds: el nuevo instrumento del UIH](https://uih.uy/noticias/lanzamiento-matching-funds), UIH (last accessed 2025). [^85]: [Microsoft and Harvard Recognize Uruguay as an Innovation HUB](https://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy/en/news/article/microsoft-and-harvard-recognize-uruguay-as-an-innovation-hub/), Uruguay XXI (2024). [^86]: [State of European Tech Report](https://www.stateofeuropeantech.com/chapters/executive-summary), Atomico (2024). [^87]: [State of European Tech Report](https://www.stateofeuropeantech.com/chapters/executive-summary), Atomico (2024). [^88]: [Building CERN for AI](https://cfg.eu/building-cern-for-ai/), Centre Future Generations (2025). [^89]: Ian Lane, [‘Deeptech sector primed to benefit from pensions investment proposals’](https://www.ftadviser.com/pension-reform/2025/5/30/deeptech-sector-primed-to-benefit-from-pensions-investment-proposals/), FTAdviser (2025). [^90]: [The Tibi Initiative : Phase-2 and Perspectives](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2024/05/15/the-tibi-initiative-phase-2-and-perspectives-1), DG Trésor (2024). [^91]: [Pension Markets In Focus: Preliminary 2024 data - June 2025](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/asset-backed-pensions/PMF%202025%20-%20Preliminary%202024.pdf), OECD (2025) [^92]: Phillip Tibi, [Financing the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Solving the financing grid-lock for technology companies](https://minefi.hosting.augure.com/Augure_Minefi/r/ContenuEnLigne/Download?id=64E9EE59-8C0E-42E1-950F-1E0A25C80029&filename=Rapport%20Tibi%20-%20EN%20-%20Financing%20the%20fourth%20industrial%20revolution.pdf), French Ministry of Economy and Finance (2018). [^93]: [Pensions & Private Capital Expert Panel](https://www.bvca.co.uk/static/24cc58d1-32d5-4c97-9040b52055a74b3e/ba663f68-5b1c-4184-ae9d73291137560e/BVCA-Pensions-and-Private-Capital-Expert-Panel-Final-Report-2025.pdf), BVCA, 2025. [^94]: [Brazil Biotech Report](https://endeavor.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/brazilbiotechreport_EN.pdf), Endeavour (2024). [^95]: [Open Labs](https://uih.uy/open-labs), Uruguay Innovation Hub (last accessed 2025). [^96]: [StartupLab 01](https://fch.cl/iniciativa/startuplab01/), Fundación Chile (last accessed 2025). [^97]: [En Puerto Varas se inauguró “Patagonia Biotech Hub”: el Primer Centro de Innovación Biotecnológica](https://www.eha.cl/noticia/local/en-puerto-varas-se-inauguro-patagonia-biotech-hub-el-primer-centro-de-innovacion-biotecnologica), El Heraldo Austral (2024). [^98]: [Newlab](https://www.newlab.com/locations/montevideo), Newlab (last accessed 2025). [^99]: Carmen Contreras Romero, [Personal and business networks within Chilean biotech](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13662716.2018.1441013#:~:text=The%20biotechnology%20sector%20in%20Chile,2015), Industry and Innovation (2018). [^100]: Bastian Lange & Suntje Schmidt, [Entrepreneurial ecosystems as a bridging concept](https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/230186/1/grow.12409.pdf#:~:text=this%20line%20of%20thinking%2C%20the,idea%20facilitation%20comparable%20to%20social), Growth and Change (2021). [^101]: [The Cambridge Cluster](https://www.cambridgenetwork.co.uk/the-network/cambridge-cluster?utm_source=chatgpt.com), Cambridge Network (last accessed 2025). [^102]: [Israeli Innovation Ecosystem](https://startupnationcentral.org/), Startup Nation Central (last accessed 2025). [^103]: [Startup Capital Berlin](https://www.businesslocationcenter.de/en/startup-capital-berlin), Business Location Center (last accessed 2025). [^104]: Michael Leatherbee, [Boulevard of Broken Behaviors: Socio-Psychological Mechanisms of Entrepreneurship Policies](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2488712#:~:text=Start,social%20interaction%20between%20these%20groups), Social Science Research Network (2014). [^105]: [Startup Chile](https://startupchile.org/en/#:~:text=), Startup Chile, (last accessed 2025). [^106]: [Sciencepreneurs - Deep Tech Colombia Report 2024](https://olartemoure.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sciencepreneurs_-DeepTech-Colombia-Report-2024-ENG.pdf#:~:text=We%20are%20a%20network%20of,impact%20in%20the%20global%20market), Olarte Moure (2024). [^107]: [Sciencepreneurs - Deep Tech Colombia Report 2024](https://olartemoure.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sciencepreneurs_-DeepTech-Colombia-Report-2024-ENG.pdf#:~:text=We%20are%20a%20network%20of,impact%20in%20the%20global%20market), Olarte Moure (2024). [^108]: [Sciencepreneurs - Deep Tech Colombia Report 2024](https://olartemoure.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sciencepreneurs_-DeepTech-Colombia-Report-2024-ENG.pdf#:~:text=We%20are%20a%20network%20of,impact%20in%20the%20global%20market), Olarte Moure (2025). [^109]: Bastian Lange & Suntje Schmidt, [Entrepreneurial ecosystems as a bridging concept](https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/230186/1/grow.12409.pdf#:~:text=this%20line%20of%20thinking%2C%20the,idea%20facilitation%20comparable%20to%20social), Growth and Change (2021). [^110]: Bastian Lange & Suntje Schmidt, [Entrepreneurial ecosystems as a bridging concept](https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/230186/1/grow.12409.pdf#:~:text=this%20line%20of%20thinking%2C%20the,idea%20facilitation%20comparable%20to%20social), Growth and Change (2021). [^111]: Christina Guenther et al., [Referrals among VCs and the length of due diligence: The effect of relational embeddedness](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0883902622000428?utm_source=chatgpt.com), Journal of Business Venturing (2022). [^112]: C.P. Eveleens et al., [How network-based incubation helps start-up performance: a systematic review against the background of management theories](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10961-016-9510-7#:~:text=find%20that%20the%20network,There%20is%20a), The Journal of Technology Transfer (2016). [^113]: Benjamin Meier et al., [A self-assessment tool for ecosystem builders](https://www.swisscontact.org/_Resources/Persistent/9/e/4/6/9e460276b4833cf7bf51af06fba21c7599a78a81/Ecosystem%20Health%20Check.pdf), Swisscontact (2021). [^114]: [Unlocking Innovation through Corporate-Startup Collaboration](https://hello-tomorrow.org/corporate-startup-collaboration/), Hello Tomorrow (2025). [^115]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^116]: Josemaria Siota & Mª Julia Prats, [Open Innovation How Corporate Giants Can Better Collaborate with Deep-Tech Start-ups. The Case of East and Southeast Asia](https://www.iese.edu/insight/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/04/2021_Open-Innovation_Corporate-venturing-Asia_Siota-Prats.pdf), IESE Business School (2021). [^117]: Josemaria Siota & Mª Julia Prats, [Open Innovation How Corporate Giants Can Better Collaborate with Deep-Tech Start-ups. The Case of East and Southeast Asia](https://www.iese.edu/insight/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2024/04/2021_Open-Innovation_Corporate-venturing-Asia_Siota-Prats.pdf), IESE Business School (2021). [^118]: Sara Frykstrand, Patrik Sobocki & Mattias Bertolino, [Deep tech funding landscape in Sweden](https://industrifonden.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Deep-tech-funding-landscape-in-Sweden.pdf), Industrifonden (2024). [^119]: [Unlocking Innovation through Corporate-Startup Collaboration](https://hello-tomorrow.org/corporate-startup-collaboration/), Hello Tomorrow (2025). [^120]: [LATAM startup market 2024 in review](https://slinghub.io/reports/Q324), SlingHub (2024). [^121]: [Global Tech Ecosystem Index 2025](https://dealroom.co/uploaded/2025/05/Dealroom-Global-Tech-Ecosystem-Index-2025.pdf), Dealroom (2025). [^122]: [The Ganesha Lab](https://theganeshalab.com/), The Ganesha Lab (last accessed 2025). [^123]: [Startup Campus, primer hub de emprendimiento de base científico-tecnológica de Chile](https://fch.cl/iniciativa/startuplab01/), Fundación Chile (2025). [^124]: [Wayra and TheVentureCity to co-invest in Latin American deep tech startups](https://latamlist.com/wayra-and-theventurecity-to-co-invest-in-latin-american-deep-tech-startups/), LatAm List (2019). [^125]: [Madrid-based Strong by Form secures €4.8 million to bring a sustainable alternative to concrete](https://www.cmpcventures.com/en/stories/madrid-based-strong-by-form-secures-e4-8-million-to-bring-a-sustainable-alternative-to-concrete/), CMPC Ventures (2023). [^126]: [MSME Financing Instruments in Latin America and the Caribbean During COVID-19](https://publications.iadb.org/en/msme-financing-instruments-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-during-covid-19?utm_source=chatgpt.com), Inter-American Development Bank (2020). [^127]: [Industry 4.0 Opportunities Behind the Challenge](https://hub.unido.org/sites/default/files/publications/UNIDO%20Background%20Paper%20on%20Industry%204.0_FINAL_TII.pdf), Unido (2017). [^128]: Eva Galvez & Giacomo Casari, [Promoting the digitalization of small and medium-sized agrifood enterprises in Asia and the Pacific](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/377701706_Promoting_the_digitalization_of_small_and_medium-sized_agrifood_enterprises_in_Asia_and_the_Pacific), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2024). [^129]: Thomas L. Friedman, [Why Trump’s Bullying Is Going to Backfire](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/opinion/trump-tariffs-economy.html), The New York Times (2025). [^130]: Monica Duffy Toft, [The Return of Spheres of Influence: Will Negotiations Over Ukraine Be a New Yalta Conference That Carves Up the World?](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-spheres-influence), Foreign Affairs (2025). [^131]: David Sacks & Adam Segal, [Why Trump’s Bullying Is Going to Backfire](https://www.cfr.org/blog/unpacking-tsmcs-100-billion-investment-united-states), The Council on Foreign Relations (2025). [^132]: [The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the Vision for 2035](https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202404/t20240428_1366248.html), People's Republic of China (2021). [^133]: Margaret Myers, Ángel Melguizo, & Yifang Wang, [Emerging Trends in Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean](https://thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Emerging-Trends-in-Chinese-Foreign-Direct-Investment-in-LAC.pdf), The Dialogue (2024). [^134]: [The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of the Vision for 2035](https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202404/t20240428_1366248.html), People's Republic of China (2021). [^135]: [Science and Technology Progress Law of the People's Republic of China](https://www.most.gov.cn/xxgk/xinxifenlei/fdzdgknr/fgzc/flfg/202201/t20220118_179043.html), People's Republic of China (2021). [^136]: [Shenzhen's "20+8" industrial cluster launches version 2.0](https://www.sz.gov.cn/cn/xxgk/zfxxgj/zwdt/content/post_11192907.html), Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (2024). [^137]: [Future industry development trends, spatial and temporal layout, and policy recommendations](https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202404/t20240428_1366248.html), People's Republic of China (2024). [^138]: Xu Weiwei, [*Shenzhen to grow as hub of innovation*](https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/359324?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *China Daily* (2023). [^139]: [*2023 Emerging Trends in Asia*](https://www.globalprivatecapital.org/app/uploads/2023/02/GPCA_2023-Emerging-Tech-Trends-in-Asia_vF.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com), Global Private Capital Association (2023). [^140]: [*Deep Tech Market Report*](https://www.futuremarketinsights.com/reports/deep-tech-market), Future Market Insights (2024). [^141]: Eduardo Baptista, [*Chinese AI start-up DeepSeek pushes US rivals with R1 model upgrade*](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-deepseek-releases-an-update-its-r1-reasoning-model-2025-05-29/), *Reuters* (2025). [^142]: [*Is China’s Manus a Game Changer for Agentic AI?*](https://www.boozallen.com/insights/tech-news/is-chinas-manus-a-game-changer-for-agentic-ai.html), *Booz Allen Hamilton* (2025). [^143]: Dongxin Gao et al., [*Establishing a New Benchmark in Quantum Computational Advantage with 105-qubit Zuchongzhi 3.0 Processor*](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.11924?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *Physical Review Letters* (2024). [^144]: *Global EV Outlook 2023: [Electric car sales break new records with momentum expected to continue through 2023](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2023/executive-summary)*, International Energy Agency (2023). [^145]: [*Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2024*](https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/80565-foreign-direct-investment-latin-america-and-caribbean-2024), ECLAC (2024). [^146]: Enrique Dussel Peters, [*Monitor de la OFDI china en América Latina y el Caribe 2024*](https://docs.redalc-china.org/monitor/images/pdfs/menuprincipal/DusselPeters_MonitorOFDI_2024_Esp.pdf), Red ALC-China (2024). [^147]: [*China’s increasing presence in Latin America: Implications for the European Union*](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769504/EPRS_BRI\(2025\)769504_EN.pdf), European Parliament (2025). [^148]: Ángel Melguizo & Margaret Myers, [*Ahead of the curve: Why the EU and US risk falling behind China in Latin America*](https://ecfr.eu/article/ahead-of-the-curve-why-the-eu-and-us-risk-falling-behind-china-in-latin-america/?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *European Council on Foreign Relations* (2024). [^149]: [*Sci-tech cooperation hailed with Latin America*](https://www.ncsti.gov.cn/home/gridview/202406/t20240613_164722.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com), China National Science & Technology Innovation Office (2024). [^150]: Matt Swayne, [*China Launches $138 Billion Government-Backed Venture Fund, Includes Quantum Startups*](https://thequantuminsider.com/2025/03/07/china-launches-138-billion-government-backed-venture-fund-includes-quantum-startups/?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *The Quantum Insider* (2025). [^151]: Eduardo Baptista, [*China offers Latin America and the Caribbean billions in bid to rival US influence*](https://www.reuters.com/world/china-latin-america-trade-exceeded-500-billion-2024-2025-05-13/?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *Reuters* (2025). [^152]: Tim Sweijs & Michael J. Mazarr, [Mind the Middle Powers](https://warontherocks.com/2023/04/mind-the-middle-powers/#:~:text=In%20international%20relations%20literature%2C%20the,Africa%2C%20Turkey%2C%20and%20Vietnam), War on the Rocks (2023). [^153]: Inter-American Development Bank, [Deep Tech: The New Wave](https://publications.iadb.org/en/deep-tech-new-wave?utm_source=chatgpt.com), IDB Lab (2023). [^154]: Christopher Freeman & Luc Soete, [*Developing Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators: What We Can Learn from the Past*](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222567577_Developing_science_technology_and_innovation_indicators_What_we_can_learn_from_the_past), *Research Policy* (2009). [^155]: [AI Competition Amid Expansion of U.S. AI Chip Export Controls Into the Gulf](https://mecouncil.org/publication/ai-competition-amid-expansion-of-u-s-ai-chip-export-controls-into-the-gulf/), Middle East Council on Global Affairs (2024). [^156]: [Colombia to build 3 datacenters with UAE support](https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/colombia-to-build-3-datacenters-with-uae-support), BNamericas (2025). [^157]: [UAE, Costa Rica committed to developing resilient economies](https://www.wam.ae/en/article/13vdzz8-uae-costa-rica-committed-developing-resilient-and)Emirates News Agency (WAM) (2024). [^158]: [Comisión de Hacienda aprueba Acuerdo de Asociación Económica Integral entre Chile y EAU](https://www.agendalogistica.cl/acuerdo-comercial-comex-emiratos-arabes-unidos/comision-de-hacienda-aprueba-acuerdo-de-asociacion-economica-integral-entre-chile-y-eau/1962721), Agenda Logística (2025). [^159]: Paloma Duran, [Mexico, UAE Seek to Deepen Economic Ties](https://mexicobusiness.news/trade-and-investment/news/mexico-uae-seek-deepen-economic-ties), Mexico Business News (2025). [^160]: Alberto Cruz, [Brazil and UAE Forge $2.5 Billion Partnership to Drive Strategic Mineral Exploration](https://www.netzerocircle.org/news/brazil-and-uae-forge-2-5-billion-partnership-to-drive-strategic-mineral-exploration), Net Zero Circle (2025). [^161]: [Placeholder for Brazil-UAE MoU specific source] [^162]: [CCBC - Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce](http://ccbc.org.br) (last accessed 2025) [^163]: [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan](http://mofa.go.jp), (last accessed 2025) [^164]: [IDB Invest and Japan's JICA announce $1 billion fund to boost private investment in Latin America](https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-invest-and-japans-jica-announce-1-billion-fund-boost-private-investment-latin-america), Inter-American Development Bank (2025). [^165]: Alvin Tan, [Speech by MOS Alvin Tan at the Inaugural Latin America-Singapore Connect](https://www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Speeches/2023/07/Speech-by-MOS-Alvin-Tan-at-the-Inaugural-Latin-America-Singapore-Connect#:~:text=d,two%20of%20the%20most%20dynamic), Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, (2023). [^166]: Alvin Tan, [Speech by MOS Alvin Tan at the Inaugural Latin America-Singapore Connect](https://www.mti.gov.sg/Newsroom/Speeches/2023/07/Speech-by-MOS-Alvin-Tan-at-the-Inaugural-Latin-America-Singapore-Connect#:~:text=d,two%20of%20the%20most%20dynamic), Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, (2023). [^167]: Weijing Ye & Jack So, [*Deep Tech Series Vol. 5: Science, Not Fiction – Insights from Singapore’s Deep Tech Venture Building*](https://www.undp.org/policy-centre/singapore/blog/deep-tech-series-vol-5-science-not-fiction-insights-singapores-deep-tech-venture-building?utm_source=chatgpt.com), UNDP Global Centre Singapore (2024). [^168]: Lim Jeong-won, [*Chile keen on collaborating with Korea on critical minerals: Chilean mining minister*](https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-06-25/national/diplomacy/Chile-keen-on-collaborating-with-Korea-on-critical-minerals-Chilean-mining-minister/2076170?utm_source=chatgpt.com), *Korea JoongAng Daily* (2024). [^169]: [CCBC - Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce](http://ccbc.org.br) (last accessed 2025) [^170]: [European Consortium Creates Airbus Industrie](https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/european-consortium-creates-airbus-industrie), EBSCO Research Starters (2025). [^171]: Edward Luce, [How Silicon Valley turned China into its lifeline](https://www.ft.com/content/94111c2c-8ec3-43a4-a71a-d73431b0325d), Financial Times (2025). [^172]: Martin Wolf, [Predictability is the victim of Trump’s tariff threats](https://www.ft.com/content/f0970c34-715e-4afb-82ec-30022ec3fb44), Financial Times (2025). [^173]: [ASPI’s two-decade Critical Technology Tracker: The rewards of long-term research](https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2024-08/ASPIs%20two-decade%20Critical%20Technology%20Tracker_1.pdf?VersionId=1p.Rx9MIuZyK5A5w1SDKIpE2EGNB_H8r) [^174]: [NATO](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/topics/nato), Foreign Affairs (last accessed 2025)